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 A decision by leaders to initiate or join a civil war is fundamentally a political decision, as 
is the decision to continue fighting in one.  Since the processes by which wars are generally 
fought are highly influenced by political choices, the United States’ decisions to sell military 
arms to Taiwan have been a major factor in deterring the PRC from attacking the ROC on 
Taiwan.  Thus, the U.S. goal as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue may be furthered by significantly increasing the 
economic, military and political cost of reunification by any means other than a peaceful 
resolution. 
 Consequently, in the post-Cold War environment, the U.S.-ROC relationship has changed 
very little.  In spite of the vast amount of weaponry purchased from the U.S., ROC armed forces 
do not possess the military hardware required to endure a long-term (more than 90 days) military 
engagement with the PRC without U.S. intervention.  Although arms sales have increasingly 
been used for political purposes, as well as military ones, experience suggests that such sales are 
no substitute for solid diplomacy and policy-making with friends as well as foes. Finally, the 
United States has a strong interest in encouraging both sides to re-energize the political and 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze U.S. arms sales to the Republic of China 
(ROC) on Taiwan as a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Thereafter, this assessment will be used to determine the 
degree to which arms sales deter the PRC’s resort to military force and further the U.S. goal as 
defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) regarding peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan issue.  However, in order to fully understand the complexity of the Taiwan issue, a 
succinct historical overview of American perspectives of the Chinese is necessary.   
Historical events such as the Opium War and the unequal treaties that resulted have 
helped shape American’s perspectives of the Chinese and exercised a considerable influence on 
U.S.-PRC post-1949 foreign relationships.  American historical perspectives of the Chinese have 
influenced subsequent generations through shared recollections of those perspectives and beliefs 
about their meaning. 1   
Frequently, such shared memories and beliefs assume mythic proportions:  mythic 
not in the sense that they have no grounding in fact, but in the sense that the 
shared belief itself is in many ways are more important than what actually 
happened in the past.2 
 
Collectively, these shared beliefs and memories are what have primarily formed the base of U.S.-
PRC foreign policy decisions regarding the Taiwan question.  
The Taiwan question is currently the most divisive issue in American-Chinese relations 
because it has predominantly evolved on both sides of the straits within the framework of 
America’s historical perspectives of China’s perceived inadequacies from the 19th century down 




in order to adequately deal with future U.S.-PRC relations, perspectives on both sides must be 
intimately understood by policy makers.  Author John K. Fairbank argued in his book The 
United States and China that America should accept the political realities of China without 
embellishment.  Also, Americans should avoid subjective assessments of these realities, desist 
from wishful thinking, and try to acquire a clear understanding of the fundamental distinctions 
between American and Chinese goals.3  In hindsight, American historical perspectives of the 
Chinese have often not been derived from pragmatic relationships, but were shaped and 
perpetuated by embellished American political and economic activities within China.  
Perceptions of the Chinese were a byproduct of that process. 
A.  ROOTS OF A CENTURY OF SHAME 
Overall, journalists have shaped America’s perspectives of the Chinese, but, beginning in 
the early 19th century, there was an explosion of American interest in East Asia that was 
spearheaded by Protestant missionaries and American traders.   
The Chinese Empire in the 1800s, still indulging itself in the remaining glory of 
the previous dynasties, was de-mystified by Westerners who came to China 
looking for business and religious conquests.  From the Westerners’ perspective, 
the widespread corruption in and extortion by China’s Imperial Court, and the 
mandarins’ arrogance toward and contempt for foreigners gave them an excellent 
excuse for aggression. 4 
 
Thus, the missionaries and traders largely shaped America’s early perceptions of China through 
their organizational affiliations and the letters and journals that they wrote which detailed their 
daily encounters with the Chinese.  Since the missionaries and traders frequently did not know 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China , (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1992). 
p. 2. 
2 Ibid., p. 2. 
3 Vladilen Vorontsov, From the Missionary Days to Reagan.  trans. David Skvirsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1987), p. 6.   
4 Mei-Ling T. Wang, The Dust that Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations 




the language or ethos, it was impossible for them to understand the society.  Invariably, early 
perspectives of the Chinese were inherently predetermined and biased. 
In 1807 the first Protestant missionary, Robert Morrison, arrived in Canton aboard an 
American vessel.  Although Morrison was British, he represented American interests in China, 
primarily because American merchants financed his voyage and gave him a huge amount of 
moral and material assistance.  
Ever since the young American bourgeoisie appeared in the arena of world trade, 
which was growing rapidly, the knowledge that Americans had of China and the 
Chinese had of the USA was formed largely under the influence of the adherents 
of the missionary movement, from the links that were established between the 
heirs of the Pilgrim Fathers and their pupils in China.5  
 
Also, Morrison carried a letter of recommendation from Secretary of State James Madison to the 
United States consul in Guangzhou.  This event established a direct link between American 
foreign policy and Protestant missionaries and American business in China, both of which 
viewed China as a treasure chest waiting to be opened in terms of souls for Christ and vast 
lucrative markets for American trade.6 
Consequently, as Western interest grew during the 1840s, the West challenged China on 
numerous fronts all at the same time.  In addition to having superior military technology, a 
recurring theme in Chinese relationships, the Western impact created a historical confrontation 
between a traditional, agrarian society and a modernizing, urban industrial one.  China’s 
traditional order was in a totally new realm.  This was the first time that China’s foes were not 
isolated, but were in close communication with each other.  When dealing with the West, 
politically isolating one state from another was not possible, which rendered China’s traditional 
                                                 
5 Vorontsov, pp. 19-20. 




diplomatic techniques of playing one state against the other totally useless.  Thus, granting a 
favor to one Western power resulted in the demanding of similar concessions by all. 
The aftermath of the Opium War established the beginning of China’s entry into the 
Western international community and the dissolution of China’s system of international 
relationships in East Asia.  On August 29, 1842, the British and Chinese signed the Treaty of 
Nanking, which “… heralded the downturn of China’s international status, opening the door for a 
series of humiliating impositions by almost all foreign powers at the time, the worst among 
which was the demand of extra-territoriality.”7  Three additional unequal treaties were 
established and signed by Britain, France, and the United States with China between 1843-1844 
that completed the settlement.  Under the provision of extraterritoriality8 and right of residence, 
Western influence dominated the treaty ports established by the treaties, making them centers of 
Western power and influence. 
Although the British fought the war and incurred most of the expenses, the United States 
and France were granted the same privileges by the inception of the most favorite nation (MFN) 
concept.9  The inception of the MFN provisions strongly shaped America’s approach toward 
China, establishing a basis of collective imperialism rather than a competitive one.  The superior 
                                                 
7 Mei-Ling T. Wang, p. 385. 
8 The Sino-U.S. Treaty of Wanghsia in 1844 was modeled on the British treaty, but it was much longer.  In Article 
21 which states, “that Americans committing crimes in China could not be tried and punished only by the consul or 
other duly empowered American officials ‘according to the laws of the United States.” See  Jonathan D. Spence,  
The Search for Modern China,   2nd ed.  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), p. 163. …”only extra -
territorial legal jurisdiction can be seen as morally reasonable, given the assumption that Chinese and Westerners 
were going to have any contact with each other at all.  Chinese lawsuits at this time involved the routine torture of 
the accused and witnesses (except for holders of state degrees}, and the convention that required someone to be 
executed in expiation of every homicide led to the judicial murder of innocent people.” See Caroline Blunden and 
Mark Elvin, Cultural Atlas of China, rev. ed. (Abington, Oxfordshire England: Checkmark Books, 1998), p.148.  In 
view of this, Chinese laws were considered to harsh or unfit for Americans.  Thus, the Chinese lost the capacity to 
adjudicate laws against Westerners in Chinese territories. 
9 Most Favorite Nation (MFN) status was originally negotiated by the British in article 8 of its their supplementary 
treaty in 1843.  It stipulated “should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional 




military technology of the West forced the Chinese to adhere to Western terms for conducting 
trade.  Consequently, the unequal treaties exacerbated the Ch’ing inadequacies as Chinese 
authorities lost control of commercial, social, and foreign policies, thus being forced to surrender 
the sovereignty over significant expanses of Chinese territory.  Despite Chinese efforts to 
establish a viable government in the first four decades of the 20th century, China did not regain 
control over most of these commercial, social, and foreign policies until 1943 at the Cairo 
Conference. 
B.  A NEW ERA (1949-1972)  
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the politically 
charged atmosphere of the 1950s subverted American perceptions of the Chinese.  The United 
States had directly intervened in the Chinese civil war, and, after the onset of the Korean War, 
the Chinese were clearly the enemy. 
Truman’s decision to intervene afresh in China’s civil war by interposing his 
Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Mainland on 27 June (two days after the 
outbreak of the Korean War) was followed by the American refusal to heed 
Chinese warnings over their northwest march in Korea.10 
 
From the early 1950s until 1971, there was no direct media coverage of China, except in rare 
cases, and virtually no American correspondent visited China for nearly two decades.11  
Americans relied heavily on foreign media and Hong Kong-based reporting about China.  During 
this period, there were two prevailing images of the Chinese that filtered through the politically 
charged atmosphere.  The first work to assess these images was by Harold Isaacs.  Compiled in 
                                                                                                                                                             
enjoyed by British subjects.”  See Blunden and Elvin, p. 163.  This concept was extended to all Western nations that 
negotiated a treaty with the Chinese. 
10 Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs  (New York: St. Martins Press, 1978), p. 54. 
11 Turmoil at Tiananmen a Study of U.S. Press Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989: A Legacy of American 
Perceptions of China . The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  June 1992 Available [Online]. 




1958, his book Scratches on Our Mind (which was re-titled and published as Images of Asia; 
American Views of China and India in 1972) was completed after the Korean War had ended.  
His work was founded on a historical and empirical analysis of American elite’s images 
of China, which was based on over 180 interviews he conducted.12  As a result of his research he 
described the perceived dichotomy of traits that Americans associated with the Chinese people 
during the 1950s and 1960s.  On the one hand, words and phases such as high intelligence, 
persistent industry, filial piety, and peacebleness characterized the image of the Chinese.  This 
image of the Chinese was widely associated with the vast riches and greatness of Chinese 
civilization.  On the other hand, descriptions of the Chinese were often shrouded by words such 
as cruelty, barbarism, inhumanity and the facelessness of an impenetrable mass.  This image was 
associated with the seemingly timeless atrocities that occurred in China and the expressionless 
faces on the newsreels that witnessed the savagery of World War II and the Chinese Civil War 
with very little or no expression.  Consequently,   
Isaacs maintained that historically, American admiration of China’s ancient 
greatness and related high expectations seldom matched its real experience with 
the Chinese, both in the United States and China.  In other words, while abstractly 
the Chinese were regarded as a “superior people’, in reality they always appeared 
as an ‘inferior people.’13  
 
In conclusion, Isaacs noted that the American image of the Chinese revered a timeless 
phenomenon of unparalleled proportion while dealing with a vision of inadequacy and despair.14 
Next, Archibald Trojan Steele’s book, which was completed in 1966 during the Vietnam 
War, and was called The American People and China, revealed that most Americans viewed the 
Chinese as ideologically untouchable during the 1950s and 1960s.  This negative sentiment was 
                                                 
12 Jian Wei Wang, Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 7. 
13 Ibid., p. 8. 




based on the deep ideological differences that existed between American capitalism and Chinese 
communism at the time.  The data he used for his study were collected primarily from a 
nationwide survey of public opinion and a series of more than 200 interviews he conducted.  The 
people that were polled occupied positions of responsibility and leadership throughout the United 
States.15  Although a number of the respondents lacked basic knowledge of China--including the 
fact that the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was a communist regime--they consistently 
viewed the PRC as a threat. 
His data also confirmed American disdain for the Chinese people.  In a 1966 survey 
conducted in the United States, four of the top five words the respondents considered as best 
describing the Chinese people were negative.  “The Chinese people were considered ‘ignorant’, 
‘warlike’, ‘sly’, and ‘treacherous’.”16  This attitude would cloud American-Chinese relationships 
until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when diplomatic efforts ended the period of no 
communication and build support for a more flexible China policy. 
Beginning in early 1969, the CCP leadership began to take a moderate course in its 
foreign policy.  The PRC was admitted to the United Nations (UN) in October 1971, removing 
the ROC.  Ping-pong diplomacy began with an exchange of ping-pong teams that opened up 
contact with the United States and finally President Nixon visited China in February 1972. 
How long would America’s anomalous images of China last?  American perceptions of 
China had been oscillating between the poles of attraction and repulsion for decades before 
President Nixon’s historic visit to China set off an explosive period of interest in China once 
again. 
On 21 February 1972 at 11:30 a.m., the Spirit of America rolled to a stop on the 
tarmac at the Capital Airport near Beijing, China.  On board was the second half 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 9. 




of the largest, and arguably the most important, foreign delegation ever to visit the 
People’s Republic of China.  The President of the United States, accompanied by 
his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, his secretary of state, William 
Rogers…disembarked to be greeted by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.17   
  
A day prior, the media corps arrived.  Among them were 87 distinguished television and print 
journalists, including Walter Cronkite, Barbara Walters, Dan Rather, columnists William F. 
Buckley and Theodore H. White.  This elaborate presence began to change the face of China in 
the United States.  For eight days the United States delegation toured China and reported on the 
new China of peaceful construction, socialist civilization, and ideals that appealed to the 
egalitarian strain in American thought.18  Chinese fashions were en vogue, and a basic curiosity 
about Chinese culture began to blossom.  One of America’s most hated enemies was being 
transformed into an ally. 
While most journalists felt that the reshaping of China’s image was long overdue, for 
President Nixon, who played the central role in reshaping the image of China, it was a political 
necessity. 19  Opening a new political relationship with the PRC after decades of mutual 
estrangement in an election year was just what his re-election campaign needed. 
A Gallup Poll taken a few days after his return from Beijing revealed that the 
public now had a ‘far more favorable image’ of the Chinese Communists than it 
had in 1966.  Favorable terms like ‘hard working,’ ‘practical,’  ‘intelligent, 
’artistic,’ and progressive’ were selected over negative terms by more than 3 to 1.  
American perceptions of China had once again flipflopped.20 
 
Politically, the signing of the 1972 joint communiqué on U.S.-China relations and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations on News Year’s day 1979 under President Jimmy Carter 
characterized the 1970s.  The strategically calculated rapprochement with China by America’s 
                                                 
17 Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: America’s Illusions and Chinese Reality (United States of America: 
Basic Books, 1990), p. 1. 
18 Ibid., p. 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 2. 




top decision-makers touched off a period characterized by political disillusionment with the 
conditions in the United States more than mutual understand ing of China. 
 After the initial political and media frenzy decrescendo, confidence-building measures, 
such as person-to-person contact, resumed.  For the Americans who visited China, guided 
tourism produced a remarkably uniform and positive set of impressions.21  Images of a nation 
that seemingly faced a vast set of insurmountable problems in 1949 seemed to have vanished in 
the wake of a magical visit by President Richard Nixon, “foreign devil.” 
The nation appears to have regenerated itself and to be making economic and 
social progress.  Moreover, the Chinese have undertaken bold experiments in a 
number of areas that are of direct concern to us, such as bureaucratic practice 
[e.g., the arrest of officials by young thugs], education [closing the universities], 
the pattern of urbanization [keeping the peasants out of the cities], penology 
[labor reeducation camps], public health [barefoot doctor]…22 
 
Americans were astonished by the progress that the Chinese had seemed to make in such a short 
period without Western assistance.  Those who visited brought back bits and pieces of China that 
they thought Americans could emulate and learn from, such as the new secular religion of 
Maoism.  In hindsight, this thought is absurd, but during this pessimistic period of American 
history, some opinions on the Cultural Revolution saw it as a far-reaching moral crusade to 
change the very human Chinese personality in the direction of self-sacrifice and serving others.23  
What the journalists and visitors saw and depicted was a Chinese state that was outwardly 
underdeveloped and even backward, but not without genuine strivings for change.24 
C.  SUMMARY 
Chinese, like other people, rightly assume that if a stranger does not know the language, 
he or she does not know the social conventions or ethos either.  Consequently, from the 
                                                 
21 J. Wang, p. 10. 
22 Mosher, p. 159. 




beginning, American perspectives of the Chinese have been a continuum of inaccurate 
distortions of Chinese culture and values from an American perspective.  As John K. Fairbank 
argued in the book The United States and China, Americans should accept the political realities 
of China without embellishment.  Also, they should avoid subjectivist assessments of these 
realities, desist from wishful thinking, and try to acquire a clear understanding of the 
fundamental distinctions between Chinese and American societies.25  The absence of these 
fundamental facts inherently perpetuated the missionaries’ and traders’ cultural biases and 
predisposition, therefore questioning their grasp of China and their intentions.26 
In the wake of over a century and a half of cross-cultural communications and 
miscommunications, the structural continuities in American-Chinese relationships have been 
obscured.  On the one hand, Americans have continually tried to exploit China’s vast resources 
and influence its growth as a nation-state by imposing their cultural, economic and educational 
values on it because of China’s perceived backwardness.  No matter what the costs of these 
perceived benevolent acts were, Americans have felt that they were necessary and that China 
would eventually benefit from them by becoming a modern nation-state.  On the other hand, the 
Chinese have primarily rejected American advances as unbidden acts of imperialism, which have 
mainly provided “spiritual pollution” for the Chinese people.  The implicit message in John K. 
Fairbank’s book, The United States and China, is that Americans must respect Chinese values 
and build a constructive understanding of them instead of continually seeking to denigrate, 
embellish and destroy them.  Thus, the result of years of American ambivalence in American-
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Turmoil, <http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/TatTcontent.html > 
25 Vorontsov, p. 6.  





Chinese relationships is a present day America that may possess confused and unrealistic 



















































II.  HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
After the U.S. began its rapprochement with China in 1972, the ROC’s diplomatic status 
was placed in limbo by the signing of the January 1,1979 joint communiqué establishing the 
diplomatic relationships between the PRC and the United States of America.  In that declaration, 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remained a side issue, a question that would be answered later.  In 
practice, this declaration resolved Taiwan’s status, but it left the question of U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan open to interpretation, thereafter creating the current controversy.  The PRC resolutely 
insists that U.S. arm sales to the ROC defy the spirit and intent of the 1972 Shanghai, 1979 and 
1982 joint communiqués.  The background of this controversy has long roots in U.S.-China 
relations. 
1.  Cairo Conference  
As Japanese forces lost momentum during World War II in the Pacific region, the island 
of Taiwan gained importance.  At the 1943 Cairo Conference, the big three--Churchill, Roosevelt 
and Stalin--agreed to return Taiwan to China.27  Accordingly, no high- level American officials 
deliberated Taiwan’s independence or annexation.  This decision was confirmed by the Potsdam 
Proclamation of July 26, 1945.  After the Japanese surrendered in October 1945, the ROC 
proclaimed that Taiwan was reunited with the mainland and sovereign territory of China.  This is 
important because it means that the PRC has never controlled Taiwan and its irredentist claim is 
based solely on China’s historical territorial claim to the island. 
                                                 
27 “The agreement to assign Taiwan to China, once Japan had been defeated, was made without Taiwan’s approval, 
an apparent violation of the Atlantic Charter which held that territorial changes should be in accord with the freely 
expressed wishes of the people concerned.”  James H. Hughes, “The Peoples Republic of China Confronts Taiwan,” 




2.  Post-War China 
On October 17, 1945, escorted by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, an estimated 12,000 troops of 
the 62nd and 70th Division Chinese Nationalist Army landed on Taiwan at the ports of Keelung 
and Kaohsiung. 28  A large enthusiastic crowd whose cheers would soon turn into dismay greeted 
the undisciplined and war battered Nationalist troops who were supposed to liberate Taiwan 
from the defeated Japanese.  Although the inhabitants believed that the stage had been set for 
reunification, Taiwan was viewed by the Nationalist regime’s troops as part of the booty of war. 
Meanwhile, on the mainland prior to the end of World War II, the stage was set for a 
monumental civil war between the Communists led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalists led by 
Chiang Kai shek.  The Communists steadily expanded their guerrilla bases and territories, built 
larger armies, and extended their capabilities for civil rule.  After a long and bitter struggle 
between the two, the Communists prevailed and on October 1, 1949 ushered in a new regime, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Mao Zedong, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, 
triumphantly announced its arrival by proclaiming that China had finally stood up.  His remarks 
were made in reference to China’s ominous past, in which it had been systemically divided and 
preyed on by the Japanese and Western powers.  As a result of the prolonged period of civil and 
international hostilities, China emerged as a weak and frail nation that felt threatened by the 
United States and a reemerging Japan. 
3.  Korean War 
Consequently, the American decision to intervene in the Korean War and not to heed 
China’s warnings over their march into Korea led to Chinese intervention.  To the Truman 
administration, there was a strong hint that the Soviet backed Chinese intervention was primarily 




the United States as a move toward reuniting Korea was perceived by Mao as a threat to PRC 
security and the survival of its newly established revolutionary regime.  Consequently, it 
Asianized the Korean War.29 
The Korean War also served as a mechanism that instantly transformed Japan from an 
occupied nation to an ally in defense of the free world. The war also united the PRC with North 
Korea against the United States under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Author Akira Iriye 
argued that the outbreak of the Korean War itself might have resulted from the lack of 
militarization in Asia and the opportunistic attempt of the North Koreans to unify the peninsula, 
rather than from any concerted design of the communists to extend their power base relative to 
that of the West and its allied.30  However, from an American perspective, the ideological divide 
in the Asia-Pacific was unmistakably defined by North Korea’s action, which confirmed 
Taiwan’s strategic value for the United States.  “In view of these circumstances Taiwan was 
regarded as one of the critical links in the U.S. defense line, whose loss to Communist forces 
would denigrate the U.S. position in Japan and the Philippines.”31  
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, State Department and General MacArthur realized 
the strategic value and the consequences of an unfriendly communist state controlling Taiwan, 
U.S. policy maintained that the Taiwan issue was a low priority because of the potential need of 
U.S. forces elsewhere (America’s strategic emphasis was in the West).32  Consequently, on 
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29“[It] effectively integrated the Asia-Pacific into the Cold War system that had first emerged in Europe.  But unlike 
the situation in Europe where the Cold War divided the protagonists into two clearly defined camps of opposing 
ideological, economic and political systems  separated by an ‘iron curtain’, the divisions in Asia were less clear cut 
and were still being contested long after they had been settled in Europe.”  Michael B. Yahuda, The International 
Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 21. 
30 Christopher Howe, ed.  China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 47. 
31 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 9. 
32 “As early as November 1948, when the Truman administration reexamined America’s China policy, the JCS 
concluded in a memo entitled ‘Strategic Importance of Formosa’ that the prospect of a Taiwan controlled by 




January 5, 1950, President Harry S. Truman solidified Taiwan’s status by announcing that the 
United States had no intention of obtaining special privileges in Taiwan or intervening in the 
Chinese Civil War at present or in the future.  But, on June 27, 1950 President Truman in a 
highly politicized decision, reversed his stance on Taiwan by interposing the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
between Taiwan and the mainland, two days after the Korean War began. 
B.  COLD WAR  
1.  Arms Sales to Taiwan 
 As the U.S. policy of containment expanded in the 1950s, so did the scope of U.S. direct 
military support, hence, bringing Taiwan into its purview after the hostilities began on the 
Korean peninsula.33 
The threat which the Chinese Nationalist regime posed to Peking’s security 
interests was much magnified as the United States drew closer to Chiang and gave 
him increased support.  Because the Chinese civil war had not run its course, the 
American effort to employ deterrence strategy on behalf of the Nationalist regime 
on Taiwan resulted in a confusion of containment with ‘liberation,’ thereby 
greatly exacerbating tensions and inviting dangerous crises.34 
 
Thereafter, in 1954, the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, which 
remained in force until 1979.  The original intent of U.S. military support was to bolster 
Taiwan’s combat capabilities because it was one of the key forward defense countries on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
allow the Communists to dominate sea lanes between Japan and Malaya, thus threatening the Philippines, the 
Ryukyus, and ultimately Japan itself…A State Department draft report to the National Security Council in January 
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Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists.”  Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the 
Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 115-116. 
33 Roger P. Labrie, et al., U.S. Arms Sales Policy Background and Issues (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise 
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periphery of the communist world.35  Thus, the U.S. goal was deterring the PRC from attacking 
and reducing the need for U.S. intervention during a crisis in the Asia-Pacific. 
Most of the weaponry that Taiwan received from 1950 to the mid-1960s was made 
available under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and consisted of older U.S. weapons 
from its World War II stockpiles.  Although, the weaponry was World War II vintage, the 
majority of U.S. arms transfers were made free of charge, “thus, beginning the use of U.S. 
military transfers as a valuable tool of U.S. foreign policy in response to perceived threats to the 
United States, its allies and friends.”36  As a result, Taiwan’s armed forces became one the 
largest and best equipped forces in the Asia-Pacific region.  
After 1965, the United States’ policy of military assistance through MAP shifted to 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), primarily because U.S. World War II stockpiles were 
diminishing. 37  By the mid-1960s, Taiwan’s economy had gained considerable strength, enabling 
the ROC to purchase a sizeable amount of military weaponry from the United States through 
FMS. 
Keeping Taiwan on the list of countries eligible to purchase weapons from the 
United States under the Foreign Military Sales Act would be particularly 
important.  International law does not require the end of agreement between 
governments upon severance of diplomatic relationships; neither does it require 
for them to remain in force.38 
 
In accordance with the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, U.S. relations with Taiwan were altered 
during the 1970s so that the U.S. could enter a coalition with the PRC to oppose the Soviet 
Union’s campaign for world hegemony.39  The U.S. rapprochement with the PRC ended 
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diplomatic recognition of and official relationships with the ROC subsequent to the signing of 
the 1979 joint communiqué establishing official ties to Beijing. 40  But, it did not resolve the 
question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
Following normalization of diplomatic relationships between the U.S. and the PRC, on 
January 1, 1979 the U.S. Congress moved to ensure that the normalization of relations with the 
PRC did not result in the abandonment of Taiwan.  What resulted was a concerted effort by the 
Carter White House, the Departments of State and Defense, leading members of both political 
parties, and expert legal scholars that contributed to the fundamental soundness of not only the 
wording of the legislation but also to its underlying concepts of what became the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA).41  This legal document, an American law enacted by the U.S. Congress on 
April 10, 1979, is what enabled the United States to maintain an unofficial presence in Taiwan 
and the region.  Its original intent was to allow Taiwan a “decent interval” before capitulating to 
the PRC, but it has evolved into a law that ensures direct U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait 
                                                                                                                                                             
This meant that the United States could use its relationship with one of the Communist powers as a means of putting 
pressure on the other.  When Soviet-U.S. relationships deteriorated in the late 1970s, there was talk in the Carter 
administration of ‘playing the China card.’  A de facto Sino-U.S. alliance could provide a means of containing the 
USSR.” See Derek McDougall, The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1997), p. 76. 
40 In accordance with the Joint Communiqué to establish Diplomatic Relationships between the People’s Republic of 
China and the United States of America, the U.S. government issued its official statement on December 15, 1978 
that established its official position on the Taiwan issue by including the following statements.  “As of January 1, 
1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China…The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future.  The United 
States continued to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue 
will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” See Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock, Treaties of the 
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1978: An Annotated Compilation  (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1980), p. 204.  
Since the signing of the 1979 Joint Communiqué this has been the official position advocated by all subsequent U.S. 
administrations. 
41 Stanley O. Roth.  Address to the Woodrow Wilson Center and the American Institute in Taiwan Washington, DC, 
March 24, 1999.  The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty – and Beyond . Available [Online]. 




for a long time.42  Also, it is currently interpreted as the primary document that governs U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan. 
 After Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter in the 1980 U.S. presidential 
election, one of the most perplexing problems his administration dealt with was the arm sales to 
Taiwan.  “This was the question that had been left unanswered by Carter and Deng Xiaoping 
when they had hurriedly conducted the deal for normalization of relations at the end of 1978.”43  
Thereafter, the PRC demanded a termination date on the U.S. arms to Taiwan or else it would 
downgrade its relationships with the United States.  Ultimately, the Reagan Administration 
acceded, but not completely.  It compromised by agreeing to the terms of the August 17, 1982 
joint communiqué. 
The 1982 communiqué was the most controversial agreement ever reached 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.  Although the 
Reagan administration did not promise to end all arms sales to Taiwan, it did 
agree to set strict limits on these sales, where none existed before.44 
 
The Reagan administration negotiated the 1982 Joint Communiqué in good faith, but practically 
it did not entirely adhere to it.45  Starting from late in the Carter Administration through the 
Reagan Administration, in practice, the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) regulated U.S. arm 
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sales to Taiwan. 46  “In the Chinese political context, international law is believed to have 
precedence over a country’s domestic law.”47  Consequently, Beijing has resolutely believed that 
the United States has not honored its commitment of gradually decreasing its arms sales to 
Taiwan as prescribed by the 1982 joint communiqué and that Washington favors Taiwan’s de 
facto independence. 
C.  POST-COLD WAR TRENDS 
In the course of the last ten to twelve years, the U.S.-PRC relationship has been altered 
by two strategic events.  These events are the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  “The dramatic suppression by the Chinese military of the democratic movement 
in early June 1989 and then the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the foundation of U.S. 
Cold War policy and initiated a change in policy toward the two sides.”48  Consequently, these 
events increased the significance of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and subsequently lessened the 
strategic value of PRC considerations in U.S. foreign policy. 
1.  Tiananmen Incident 
Prior to the Tiananmen incident, “President Bush [Sr.] basically followed a similar 
conceptual framework employed by Reagan in conducting his China policy, which required the 
United States to maintain official relationships with China and support unofficial, cultural and 
commercial exchanges with Taiwan.”49  But, the violent suppression of the student 
demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 shocked Americans with the level of brutality and 
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brought the maturation process of ties between the United States and China to an abrupt end.  
From June 3-8, 1989, the Chinese Army massacred hundreds of unarmed, pro-democracy student 
protesters at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.  The perceived, birth and death of democracy in 
China was earmarked by this event.  The only other event that received as much media coverage 
in Chinese history was President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. 
This horrific act caused a huge amount of shock and horror among American people as 
well as among the millions of people around the world that witnessed it, according to public 
opinion polls.  As the PRC’s government worked to recover from this incomprehensible 
situation, an indelible impression was left on the American public that associated its actions with 
the communists of old.  Each time CNN rebroadcast the scenes of a million or more Chinese 
surging through the streets of Beijing in protest of corruption, bureaucracy, and dictatorship, 
Americans became more enraged.  American public regard for the PRC after Tiananmen Square 
was extremely low, according to a Gallup poll conducted six weeks after the massacre.  Eighty-
seven percent of those polled felt that their actions were unjustified.  The communists were 
characterized as a repressive regime that had no regard for China’s people or the world. 
What made this event so vile to the Americans was the level of brutality witnessed on the 
international stage.50  Since the protection of human rights had become a high priority to the U.S. 
Congress, President George H. Bush was inclined to impose sanctions against China.  Despite 
his inclination, he failed to condemn those who were responsible for the killings, although the 
process of maturing ties between the United States and China came to an impasse.  As China lost 
favor among U.S. policymakers, Taiwan gained favor among them.   Thus, “the Tiananmen 
Square incident of 1989 became an opportunity for Taiwan to push for a relaxation in U.S. arms 
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sales policy to Taiwan”51 as a more favorable atmosphere was created in the U.S. Congress for 
Taiwan.  
2.  Collapse of the Soviet Union 
Soon after the Tiananmen incident, the Soviet Union collapsed.  For U.S.-PRC 
relationships, this was monumental because the United States and China no longer faced a 
common enemy, causing the United States to review the appropriateness of its earlier “China 
card” policy. 52   The coalition formed by the United States and China during the 1970s and 1980s 
to oppose the Soviet Union’s campaign for world hegemony came to an end.  Instead of this 
being the core issue in U.S.-PRC relations, the Taiwan issue once again became the central item 
of conflict. 
This marked the rise of perceptions of the PRC as a regional threat to U.S. interests and 
led to President George H. Bush’s decision to sell Taiwan (150) F-16 A/B to Taiwan in 1992.53  
Some critics argued his decision “would irreparably damage U.S.-PRC relations and China’s 
participation in world affairs.”54  Others argued that, “the sale would help to stabilize the 
regional balance because China was aggressively seeking more advanced aircraft like Su-27s 
from Russia.”55  In view of this, the administration viewed this sale as a means for the United 
States to maintain the cross strait balance of power, thus creating a slippery slope for the U.S. 
arms sales policy to Taiwan.  After the Soviet Union’s downfall, the value of PRC strategic 
considerations in U.S. policy began to decline and were conversely offset by the increased 
strategic value of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
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While the Tiananmen incident caused immediate changes to U.S. policy with some 
residual effects, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused changes in the international system.  It 
consequently changed the overall structure of U.S policy and will have long-term effects.56  
However, the aggregate effect of these events created a dilemma for U.S. policy makers by 
interrupting numerous long-held strategic continuities in U.S. foreign policy.  Thereafter, the 
consensus for Taiwan in U.S. policy was temporarily lost.  During the 1990s, U.S policy-makers 
had to decide whether to support Taiwan’s self-determination57 or support (PRC) national 
sovereignty, which helped maintain world order.58  Subsequently, policy-makers chose the 
former and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increasingly took on the saliency of a de facto defensive 
treaty, which gave U.S. policy-makers a means of acknowledging the PRC’s claim to Taiwan 
while not affirming it in U.S. foreign policy. 
D.  U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY 
1.  Implicit Contradictions in U.S. Policy 
Within the framework of U.S. arms sales policy to Taiwan, there are implicit 
contradictions embedded in the 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué and the TRA which have 
allowed numerous large-scale purchases of defensive weaponry by Taiwan.  Over the past 19 
years under the authority of the TRA, Taiwan has received more than $20 billion worth of 
defense weaponry, primarily from the United States.  These include: anti-ship missiles; air 
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defense missiles; tanks; air-to-air missiles for the 150 F-16 fighters sold in 1992; Stinger surface-
to-air missiles; frigates; Cobra helicopters; anti-submarine torpedoes; early warning aircraft; and 
a host of air defense radar and communication systems.59  In midst of the numerous sales, 
Beijing has continually protested them and continually evoked the terms of 1982 joint 
communiqué, specifically paragraph six which states, 
…the United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long-
term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, 
either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent 
years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States 
and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, 
leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. 60 
 
These protests have mostly been ignored.61  Such large quantities of weaponry directly affect the 
ROC’s ability to sustain combat operations, a key factor influencing the costs of an attack on 
Taiwan by the PRC.  Although the PRC’s order of battle (OOB) is numerically superior to 
Taiwan’s and is currently estimated at a 7 to 1 ratio, ROC defense planners estimate that its 
armed forces are capable of withstanding a prolonged military attack by the PRC for a maximum 
of 90 days without U.S. intervention. 
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2.  Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act  
 The Executive Summary of the December 19, 2000 “Pentagon Report on the 
Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act” acknowledges the PRC’s claim to Taiwan, and 
continues by stipulating that, 
The United States takes its obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-
defense capability very seriously…This is not only because it is mandated by U.S. 
law in the TRA, but also because it is in our own national interest.  As long as 
Taiwan has a capable defense, the environment will be more conducive to 
peaceful dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable.62 
 
It also states that the aims of U.S. arms sales are “to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense 
capability, while also reinforcing regional stability.”63  In reference to these goals, ROC armed 
forces have been supplied with U.S. weapon systems 64 to maintain a credible self-defense 
capable of accomplishing the following defensive goals: 
1. Maintaining an effective national surveillance and warning network. 
 
2. Maintaining sovereign control over Taiwanese territories, being able to deter, limit or 
contain various internal and external violations, excluding the islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu. 
 
3. Being able to reinforce the state of readiness in exposed areas with the appropriate 
military means. 
 
4. Being able to put up the strongest possible defense against blockades and other forms of 
PRC military aggression. 
 
5. Preparing adequate facilities for receiving allied military reinforcements in the case of an 
unprovoked military attack by the PRC. 
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Since 1979, the TRA has provided Taiwan a means of maintaining a self-defensive capability, 
although the ROC government has never officially declared its independence form the PRC.65  
Above and beyond that, the majority of the world does not recognize Taiwan as an independent 
state.  In sum, Taiwan’s de facto independence is awkward and insecure from the perspective of 
international law and the international system. 66 
With these factors in mind, the PRC believes that regional peace and stability will 
ultimately be served by ending the long-standing civil war with Taiwan through reunification 
with the mainland.  This is based on four principles: 
1. Beijing’s preference for a peaceful resolution. 
2. China’s sovereign and legitimate claim to Taiwan.   
3. Beijing’s readiness to use force if necessary.  Thus, the rationale for using force remains 
firmly within Beijing’s belief system; China is a sovereign state; Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of China; If Taiwan declares its independence, if Taiwan is occupied by a foreign 
country, if it acquires nuclear weapons or continually reject negotiations to the settlement 
of the cross-Strait reunification over an inordinate amount of time, it is the right of the 
Chinese government to use any means to restore order and maintain its national integrity. 
 
4. Chinese decision-makers’ and the public’s perception of the United States as an 
interloper in regards to Taiwan. 
 
Working within this framework, the PRC believes it will be able to enhance the Asia-Pacific’s 
fragile security environment by solidifying its sovereign claim over Taiwan. 
 Although Taiwan lacks international legitimacy, the consensus among U.S. policy 
makers is that Taiwan’s de facto independence has been a resounding success according to the 
goals stipulated by paragraph 2a in the TRA, 67  
...(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) 
to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation 
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of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United 
States and the people on Taiwan. 68   
 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have helped preserve the substance of this relationship through 
providing the ROC an effective military means of accomplishing the five goals of its national 
defense and to develop without the constraints of a socialist system.  Overall, U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan since 1979 have unequivocally enhanced Taiwan’s self defense capability by 
modernizing its armed forces’ orders of battle, military facilities, and ability to absorb new 
military technologies.  This supports internal regime stability through promoting regional peace 
and stability through deterrence, regardless of the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan, a major 












                                                 
68 Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, “Taiwan Relations Act.” Available [Online]. < 





























III.  U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
 A decision by leaders to initiate or join a civil war is fundamentally a political decision, 
as is the decision to continue fighting in one.69  Since the processes by which civil wars are 
generally fought are usually influenced by political choices, the United States’ decisions to sell 
military arms to Taiwan have been a major factor in deterring the PRC from attacking Taiwan.  
Thus, the U.S. goal-as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)-of a 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue may be furthered by supporting a credible deterrent that 
will significantly increase the PRC’s cost of reunification in terms of political, economic and 
military factors when pursued by other means than a peaceful resolution.  Post-1979 arms sales 
to Taiwan are at the core of this process, and they reflect the dynamic nature of the numerous 
competing interests and policy objectives defined in the TRA, many of which have changed 
since 1979 and continue to evolve.70  This chapter will analyze the aggregate affect of post-1979 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship. 
A government’s legitimacy depends on the extent to which it can make a plausible claim 
to represent the will of its people.71  Through the implementation of the TRA, Taiwan’s 
fundamental interests, such as its economic, territorial, political, and social integrity, have been 
secured and hence have promoted the prosperity of its people since the normalization of 
                                                 
69 D. Scott Bennett, and Allan C. Stam III, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” American Political 
Science Review, 90, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 239. 
70 Following this formula of deterrence “if a military clash occurred, even a limit one, tremendous damage would 
done, both to Taiwan and to U.S.-China relationships. Failure to deter conflict also would be regarded in Asia as a 
failure of U.S. leadership.”  See Riahard D. Fisher, “China’s Threat to Taiwan Challenge U.S. Leadership in Asia,” 
Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, 139 (March 1996), p. 1. Avialable [Online]. 
<http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/asc139.html > [20 March 2002].  Thus, the United States must 
maintain its outright commitment to Taiwan in order to reduce suspicions and doubts from other allies in the region 
about the United States’ reliability in keeping its defense commitments.  See Lee, p. 70. 
71 Samuel P. Huntington, “Toward Consolidated Democracies.”  Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: 
Themes and Perspectives: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Larry Diamond and et al (Baltimore: John Hopkins 




diplomatic relationships between the United States and China.  It has also supported U.S. foreign 
policy goals, such as deterring aggression, promoting democracy, and ensuring U.S. economic 
access to important markets, commodities, and trading partners on Taiwan.  Although this 
directly conflicts with the PRC’s current protocol policy as defined by its 2000 White Paper 
“The One China Policy and the Taiwan Issue,” the PRC has not recently conveyed any warnings 
about downgrading Sino-U.S. relations.72  Thus, the United States has been able to maintain very 
complex, but relatively stable relationships with the Taiwan and China, while promoting the 
prosperity of the American people. 
For the United States, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 manifested new strategic 
implications, primarily because the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan 
had been abrogated.  Thereafter, the TRA served as the basic framework for U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, granting the President and the Congress a considerable amount of diplomatic latitude 
when dealing arms to Taiwan. 
Clearly, after the Cold War, arms sales have become an important aspect of 
foreign trade used to improve the balance of payments and generate employment 
in the high tech sector.  During the 1980s the United States experienced economic 
decline and a dramatic increase in the trade deficit. Compared to other sectors of 
the economy, the U.S. is by far the most competitive in the world arms market 
and military technology. 73 
 
On the one hand, this diluted the actual intent and purpose of post-1979 U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, which was best exemplified by the President George H. Bush’s decision to sell F-16 
fighter aircraft in 1992.74  But on the other hand, for Taiwan this indicated an increased level of 
                                                 
72 White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.  21 February 2000]. Available [Online]. 
<http://www.fas.org/news/china/taiwan00.htm > [21 June 2001]. 
73 Qingmin and Hyer, p. 103.   
74 Post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan created a major source of foreign exchange, which has contributed to a 
favorable trade balance, and boosted domestic employment.  To a lesser extent they also helped “…reduce unit 
R&D cost, defray high learning cost associated with the initial stage of production of complex systems, and help 
preserve critical manufacturing capabilities and labor skills.  All of these factors were expressed in various ways… 




U.S. support for its de facto independence.  Accordingly, a number of Taiwan’s procurements 
since 1979 have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked 
credible links to its real military needs.  In sum, this suggests that in terms of overall dollar 
amounts of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 through FMS, a major portion of them has 
primarily been made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the U.S. domestic 
industry and for political gains.75 
Prior to stepping down, Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first president, resolutely stated that 
“only through actual power will there be survival, only with survival will there be prosperity.”76  
                                                                                                                                                             
Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers , Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair 
Paper 36  (1995), p. 19. Available.[Online]. <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair36/m36cont.html > [20 
March 2002].  
75 “A combination of factors are driving aggressive U.S. arms exporting today. Lingering Cold War strategic 
rationales for arms sales---the need to ‘maintain influence,’ ‘reward’ allies and maintain military basing and other 
access rights---still play an important role. But economic imperatives---principally the desire to maintain as much of 
the current arms industrial base as possible---have clearly taken on greater importance in United States' arms sales 
decision-making. In fact, the major innovation in the Clinton Administration's conventional arms transfer policy, 
made public on 17 February [1995], is that the Executive Branch will now consider the impact on the arms industry 
explicitly when deciding whether to approve an arms export.” See Lora Lumpe, “Economic Costs of Arms Exports: 
Subsidies and Offsets.”  Testimony of Lora Lumpe Director, Arms Sales Monitoring Project Federation of American 
Scientists Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate 23 May 1995 Hearing on 
U.S. Conventional Arms Export Policy.  Available [Online].  
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/subsidies/lora_testimony.htm > [23 March 2002]. 
76 Yi Ming. “HK Article says U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan to Create ‘Tripartite Problem.’” Hong Kong, Ching Pao, 1 
April 2001, no. 285, 78-80. FBIS translation.  Document ID number CPP20010410000094.  In 1999, then President 
Lee Teng-hui first articulated Taiwan’s politically authoritative definition on special state-to-state relations, which 
triggered a new period of heightened tensions in the cross-strait relations prior to its 2000 presidential election.  
Within this politically authoritative definition there were two propositions described.  First, he proposed that 
negotiations with the PRC should continue to move forward only after the PRC recognized Taiwan as an equal 
political entity. Second, he enunciated that Taiwan rejected the “one country, two systems” formula for reunification 
put forth by the PRC.  This implied that Taiwan is an independent state and designated parity and freedom as 
preconditions for reunification with the mainland. These statements convinced PRC leadership that the ROC’s next 
logical step would be an attempt at de jure independence.  Consequently, prior to its election the PRC responded to 
his assertion by publishing the 2000 white paper entitled “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, which 
reinforced that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China.  Also it restated the PRC’s intentions to use 
force in order to maintain its territorial integrity.  Although, President elect Chen Shui-bian inherited Lee Teng-hui’s 
politically authoritative legacy he has since tried to quell the controversy by declining to push for the inclusion of 
the so-called special state-to-state provisions in the ROC Constitution.  But, there is no doubt that this formula will 
continue to influence the ROC’s political views about its relations with the Mainland well into the future, primarily 
because the ROC has not rescinded it, they have only stopped using the term.  U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has helped 
increase its level of confidence and enabled it to become more politically authoritative in face of the PRC’s set self-
serving preconditions for cross-strait dialogue and negotiations (the one country, two systems) and the eight-point 
proposition made by President Jiang Zemin on China's reunification, thereby paralyzing cross-strait relations. See 




For Taiwan, its armed forces are a symbol of its national power controlled by political leaders for 
national purposes.  According to its 2000 defense policy: 
Because of the growing military threat from the PRC, our nation must, for the 
sake of survival and development as well as the safeguarding of its constitutional 
democracy and its people’s life and property, continue to maintain sufficient 
defense capabilities.  It is necessary…  Hence the defense preparations and 
defense readiness of the ROC are purely for self-defense and peacekeeping.77 
 
Therefore, in order for the Taiwan’s armed forces to move beyond a mere national symbol and to 
be a viable defense force, its armed forces’ structure must be well-equipped with adequate 
technologies, sufficient numbers of combat systems, well-trained, and adequately sustained for 
combat action. 78  Post-1979 U.S. arms sales have provided Taiwan with adequate military 
equipment, technological assistance and an informal or “tactical” alliance, which augments the 
island’s defenses.79 
According to the DOD “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense 
Authority Act,” 
China’s main national policy priority remains economic reform and development 
within an environment that is both peaceful and stable.  To that end, Beijing has 
avoided activities that might threaten its economic growth and its access to 
foreign markets, investment, and technology.  In initiating a military conflict with 
Taiwan, Beijing would run the risk of jeopardizing both its continued economic 
development and its political standing, especially among those regional states 
with which it has unresolved territorial disputes.80 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Strait,” Strategic Forum,  No. 173  (September 2000), p. 1. Available [Online]. 
<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sf173.pdf > [23 March 2002]. 
77 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China [ROC], 2000 National Defense Report: Republic of China , 
(Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, ROC, 2000), p. 59. 
78 F-16.net Three-Four-Nine Homepage, F-16 Combat Legacy: The Legacy of the F-16 “Fighting Falcon” for the 
Emerging C&EE Nations. 8 December 2000.  Available [Online]. <http://www.f-16.net/library/legacy.html > [8 
December 2001]. 
79 Dennis V. Hickey, Taiwan Security in the Changing International System. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1997), p. 39. 
80 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act: 
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China . June 2000. Available [Online].  




Fundamentally, this places U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the core of the PRC’s drive to sustain 
economic prosperity because the Taiwan issue has the potential of embroiling the entire region 
into a conflict, thus, affecting the PRC’s political calculus.81  In this regard, Japan--China’s 
largest trading partner--will potentially support the U.S. position if Taiwan is attacked by China.  
This is implied in the guidelines of the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for 
the 21st Century,” which call for cooperation to meet “…situations that may emerge in the areas 
surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of 
Japan.”82  While Taiwan is not specifically mentioned, there are strong reasons to believe that it 
will be included, in accordance with Japan’s 2001 White Paper.  Although some of Taiwan’s 
procurements since 1979 lacked credible links to its real military needs, their aggregate value is 
indisputable because they have principally formed a credible deterrent to the PRC’s aggression 
by specifically increasing its overall strategic advantages83 and decreasing its strategic 
vulnerabilities.84 
 In assessing the value of post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a politically stabilizing 
factor in the cross-strait relationship, three areas will be addressed.  They include the 
preservation of Taiwan’s democratic ways, Taiwan’s self-defense capability, and the cross-strait 
balance of military power.  An analysis of these areas will provide a precise measurement of the 
effects that post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have had in the complex cross-strait 
                                                 
81 “Deterrence at levels below the strategic differ strikingly from the strategic case in that it is primarily a question 
of influencing the opponent’s political calculus of the acceptable cost and risks of his potential initiative rather than 
simply threatening overwhelming military cost.  The operational criteria for selection among means are dominated 
not by technical or tactical but by diplomatic and political factors.”  See George and Smoke, p. 5. 
82 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.  Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century-
17 April 1996. Available [Online]. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html  > [1 
December 2001]. 
83 The overall relative power relationship of opponents that enables one nation or group of nations effectively to 
control the course of a military/political situation.  Dictionary of Military Terms: U.S. Department of Defense  




relationship.  A discussion will follow in chapter five on the significance of the U.S. role in this 
relationship and whether U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increase the likelihood of a PRC attack. 
B.  PRESERVATION OF TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIC WAYS  
American historical perspectives of China’s perceived inadequacies have transcended the 
Cold War and boiled over into the United States’ current foreign policy decisions through the 
implementation of the TRA, a de facto security treaty. 85  For all intents and purposes from 
Taiwan’s perspective, U.S. arms sales after 1979 primarily supported its self-determination and 
allowed Taiwan to maintain its claim to sovereignty by deterring PRC aggression.  U.S. arms 
sales also lent tacit support to the Taiwan authorities’ ambitious foreign policy goal of one day 
defeating the PLA and reuniting China under its leadership.  This ambitious goal was advocated 
by the Taiwan authorities officially until the end of the Cold War, but in 1991, after martial law 
was lifted, its connotations diminished and different means of unification which were less 
attached to the “one country, two system” approach were openly discussed and explored in 
Taiwan. 86  Thus, the end of martial law on Taiwan lifted government controls over the populace 
                                                                                                                                                             
84 The susceptibility of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the 
application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose.  Strategic vulnerabilities may pertain to 
political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological, or military factors. Ibid., p. 362. 
85 “There are two primary political patterns in the world today.”  One is the pattern loosely termed democracy or 
more abstractly termed liberal-democracy, a form of government found in chiefly in the West.  The other is 
communism, a pattern this is much more homogeneous than liberal-democracy, now found primarily in east and 
northeast Asia (China and North Korea) since the end of the Cold War.  “Both creeds claim to satisfy man’s deepest 
needs…” See Denis W. Brogan and Douglas V. Verney, Political Patterns in Today’s World (New York:  Harcourt, 
Brace & World Inc., 1963), p. 1.  For the United States its foreign policies decisions are still fundamentally based on 
the deep ideologically divide between American capitalism and Chinese communism that developed during the 
1950s and 1960s. 
86 By February 1991, Taiwan’s National Unification Council had adopted a new approach to unification, which was 
outlined in the document entitled the Guidelines for National Unification.  This  document’s means of reunification 
was fundamentally different than the PRC’s.  Instead of the “one country, two systems” scheduled approach with 
final unification occurring after Macao’s return in 1999, their approach was less rigid and based on mutual respect 
and reciprocity.  It required a more equitable distribution of power and was more aptly described as the “one China, 
two areas, two political entities,’ ‘peaceful and democratic unification of China,’ and ‘a three-phase, no time frame 
approach to unification.” See Mei-Ling Wang, p. 317.  The first phase of reunification would begin with exchanges 
and reciprocity, followed by increased mutual trust and cooperation in the second phase, ending with consultation 
and unification in the third phase.  This abstract approach on behalf of the unification of China brought no 




and ushered in a period of radical political reconstruction of the Nationalist state, culminating in 
1996 with Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. 87 
Although the Taiwan authorities link Taiwan’s ability to procure more advanced 
weaponry from the United States to the level of confidence that the people of Taiwan have in 
democracy, they fully understand arms procurement is not the only way to defend its national 
security.  They believe that “true and permanent peace can be achieved only through constructive 
dialogue and normalization of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”88  But, in 
the wake of the PRC’s devastating experience with socialism and the successful implementation 
of democracy in Taiwan, the great divide between them has continued to widen. 89  In view of 
this, Taiwan is impelled to purchase defensive weapons to meet its basic security needs and 
protect its people from military threat in the face of the PRC’s threat to of force against Taiwan, 
its intensified deployment of Taiwan-targeting missiles, and its reluctance to resume cross-strait 
dialogue.90 
                                                                                                                                                             
relations certainly looked promising in the first half of 1995, when leaders fro m the two sides issued their blueprints 
for the improvement of relations.  PRC President Jiang Zemin made his eight-point proposal on January 30, 1995, 
urging that a Cross-Strait summit be held on Chinese soil and suggesting that ‘talks be initiated and an agreement be 
reached on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits under the principle of 
one China.  ROC President Lee Teng-hui responded on April 8, 1995 by issuing a six-point proposal to ‘pave the 
way for peace talks on ending the state of hostility.’  President Lee Teng-hui also urged Beijing to recognize that 
‘both sides should be assured of the ability to joint international organizations on an equal footing’ and said that 
leaders of both sides may ‘meet on international occasions.” See Cheng-Yi Lin, “Confidence-Building Measures in 
the Taiwan Strait,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 23, no. 2 (2001), p. 88.  This optimistic period ended after 
President Lee Teng-hui’s historic visit to Cornell University in June of 1995 that helped precipitate the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Straits crisis.  As indicated by the denouement of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the Taiwan issue has 
the potential to gravely alter East Asia’s security balance and regional stability in which the U.S. has a major 
interest. 
87 Willem van Kemenade, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc, trans. Diane Webb (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 
1997), p. 106. 
88 Sofia Wu. “CNA: Taiwan Appreciates U.S. Arms Sales Based on Security Needs.” Taipei Central News Agency, 
25 April 2001. FBIS translation. Document ID number CPP20010425000177.   
89 PRC leaders consistently ignored the impact that imperialism has on Taiwan authorities’ thoughts about 
unification with the mainland and the Taiwan’s insistence of its democratization as a prerequisite to unification is 
irrelevant, while for the Taiwan without committed progress toward democracy and the renouncement of using 
violence in the process of unification, negotiations will be impossible with the PRC. See Mei-Ling Wang, p. 317.   




As a result, Taiwan’s political landscape has drastically changed over the past 10 to 12 
years and is vastly different than it was during most of the Cold War.  The democratization of its 
politics, which was championed by the United States, has significantly changed Taipei’s 
approach to unification with the mainland.   
…Beijing asserts that Taiwan is part of [China] and demands that Taiwan accept 
the principle of “one China” as a basis for negotiations aimed at eventual 
reunification…For its part, Taipei rejects Beijing's version of “one China” and 
demands that Beijing deal with Taiwan on an equal basis. Taipei has traditionally 
predicated unification on the condition that China attain levels of economic and 
democratic development similar to those enjoyed on Taiwan. 91 
 
In view of that, over the years the Taiwan has settled into a prosperous way of life and is willing 
to face total annihilation in order to maintain it.  By achieving democracy in their own country, 
the Taiwanese are very reluctant to surrender it by recognizing Beijing’s sovereignty over it.  
From this perspective, U.S. foreign policy confused deterrence with liberation primarily because 
it championed Taiwan’s democratization, although it is officially acknowledged as a part of 
China.92  On the one hand, democracy has strengthened Taiwan’s internal political stability; but 
on the other hand, it will impede reunification.  Thus, Taiwan’s means of accomplishing its five 
self-defense goals and its capacity to maintain a free market economy, free elections, a free 
press, and minimum human rights violations (at least compared to the PRC) for its 23 million 
people is in essence its rights to independent sovereignty and self determination. 
                                                 
91 U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm > 
92 According to the Joint Communiqué of the Establishment of Diplo matic Relationships Between the People’s 
Republic of China and the United States of America January 1, 1979, “the People’s Republic of China and the 
United States of America have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 
1979.  The United States recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China.  Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and 
other unofficial relationships with the people of Taiwan.  The People’s Republic of China and the United States of 
America reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again 
that:…The Government of the United States of America acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but one 




C.  SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY 
1.  Taiwan’s Procurement Process 
It is widely held that the Taiwan weapon procurement process is a major factor in 
determining Taiwan’s weapon procurements.93  However, this is accurate only to the degree to 
which this policy is given expression by Taiwanese authorities and appears as a formal decision 
in Taiwan.  In reality, Taiwan’s military procurements are determined by factors in which the 
Taiwanese authorities has little influence.  On the one hand, “developments in Taiwan’s military 
procurement program are driven by the military threat from China and Taiwan’s increasing 
political and diplomatic isolation.”94  But on the other hand, according to the TRA, “the 
President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and 
services based solely on their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures 
established by law.”95  In view of this, the main task of Taiwan’s military procurement process is 
to stay informed about these factors and their interplay and to attempt to influence the selection 
of specified U.S. weapon systems by the President and U.S. Congress.  This abstract relationship 
has inextricably linked Taiwan’s survival to U.S. arms sales. 
To date, it has been relatively successful because recent procurements have included F-16 
fighters, Knox class frigates, and the Modified Air Defense System—a Patriot system 
derivative.96  Also, pending arms transfers include the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air 
                                                 
093 For an overview of Taiwan’s procurement process see Michael D. Swaine, Taiwan’s National Security Policy 
and Weapons Procurement Process (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 61-71. Available.[Online]. 
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1128/ > [15 January 2002]. 
94 McClaran, p. 623. 
95 Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/taiwact.htm >  
96 Pentagon Report on Implementation of Taiwan Relation Act. Available [Online].  




Missiles (AMRAAM)97, HARPOON anti-ship missile systems (RGM-84L), and Kidd class 
destroyers.98 
The basic concept of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to seek a deterrence balance.  It 
is to enable Taiwan to maintain superiority in some key areas so that Communist 
China will have to pay a heavy price if it wants to invade Taiwan by force and 
will thus refrain from taking hasty action…[also it] increase[s] the complexity in 
assessing the feasibility of armed invasion by Communist China through 
increasing Taiwan’s superiority in some key fields.99 
 
“Thus, while Taiwan’s national defense strategy calls for balanced development of the three 
armed forces, naval and air supremacy receive first priority.”100  Maintaining a balance between 
the Taiwan’s air force and increasing the defensive capabilities of its navy are the primary goals 
of Taiwan’s present self-defense campaign because its army is no longer the primary defense 
force.  The collaborative strength of the air force and navy is what forms the base of President 
Chen Shui-bian’s “decisive war outside the borders” philosophy.  In practice, they will be used 
to deter any form of military aggression by the PRC across the 72-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, from 
contesting a blockade to defending against air attacks as they try to keep China’s military at bay.  
As a result of post-1979 U.S. arms transfers, Taiwan’s armed forces have been 
transformed into one of the most technologically advanced forces in Asia Pacific. 
Taiwan’s military modernization—its $11.2 billion defense budget is roughly the 
size of the defense expenditures of all ASEAN states combined—has directly 
                                                 
97 “It is worth noting from the U.S. sale of AIM -120 advanced intermediate air-to-air missiles, that this is currently 
the world's most advanced intermediate range air-to-air missile that has been deployed in actual combat.  It 
possesses fire-and-forget and multiple target strike capabilities. It serves as major in-service air combat equipment 
for the US Air Force.  It is equipped with advanced Doppler radar, has a maximum range of 80 km and a flight 
speed close to Mach 4.  This is the first time the United States will sell it to the Asian region, and [it is] also one of 
the advanced weapons that Taiwan’s military has struggled [to obtain] for many years.”  Wang Weixing. “PRC 
Daily Decries US Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Beijing, Guangming Ribao , 23 March 2001. FBIS translation. Document 
ID: CPP20010328000073.   
98 Federation of American Scientist: Arms Sales Monitoring Project. U.S. Arms Transfer Database. Available 
[Online]. <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/sales_db.htm > [1 December 2001].   
99 Ting Shu-fan. “Arms Dealers, Military Balance and Arms Competition.” Taipei, Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 29 March 
2001. FBIS translation.  Document ID number CPP200103290000027.  
100 Republic of China [ROC] 1998 Yearbook , “Chapter 8, National Defense.”  Available [Online]. 




impacted the PRC’s modernization.  With 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage fighters, 
Taiwan will have one of the most modern air forces in the world.101 
 
The procurement of the 150 F-16 fighters was an essential element in Taiwan’s overall self-
defense capability, primarily because it is dependent on air power.102  Without a modern and 
capable air force, Taiwan’s ability to deter the PRC would be negligible. 
2.  Case Studies 
President George H. Bush’s decision to sell the F-16 to Taiwan in 1992 fundamentally 
changed the composition of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, because prior to this agreement FMS had 
not exceeded $710 million.  This was the largest arms sales agreement between the United States 
and Taiwan, which totaled over $6.2 billion.  Also, it was a large departure from the 
conventional wisdom used by the Carter and Reagan administrations regarding arms sales to 
Taiwan.  Previously the Carter administration had rejected Taiwan’s request for advanced 
aircraft because it believed that there was no military need for such an advanced aircraft, and it 
also counseled the Reagan administration to do the same. 
[The]… primary consideration was whether these aircraft are required to meet 
likely threats in the 1980s from an equally advanced aircraft, or whether their sale 
would tend to stimulate the development of advanced aircraft by the PRC as a 
response.  Since it was thought that the PRC was unlikely to have upgraded 
aircraft in service for 10 to 15 years, it was deemed unnecessary for Taiwan to 
possess advanced aircraft.  Such logic indicated that Taiwan’s needs would be 
fulfilled only after the PRC took the first move in attempting to gain 
supremacy. 103 
 
Although this decision was made in the wake of the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, these strategic events, or the considerations that the Carter and Reagan 
                                                 
101 Robert A. Manning, “Waiting for Godot? Northeast Asian Future Shock and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” The U.S.-
Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, ed.. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin  (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 51. 
102 In 1992 Taiwan agreed to purchase 150 F-16A/B aircraft from the United States.  This also included 40 spare 
engines, 900 Sidewinder missiles, 600 Sparrow missiles, and 500,000 rounds of 20-millimeter (mm) cannon shells. 
See Hickey, p. 20. 




administrations used, were not key determinants in the sale of the F-16 to Taiwan.  Under 
extreme political pressure President George H. Bush used the PRC’s reported acquisition of 72 
Su-27 fighter and 24 MiG-31 aircrafts in 1992 to justify his decision on selling Taiwan 150 F-16 
A/Bs in 1992.104  However, most critics linked his decision to sell nearly twice as many aircraft 
to Taiwan with the 1992 Presidential campaign, where he lagged behind Democratic challenger 
Bill Clinton in the contest for Texas’ 32 electoral votes, instead of Taiwan’s practical military 
needs.  His announcement came on September 2, 1992 in Fort Worth, Texas where General 
Dynamic’s headquarters was located.  It was estimated that this deal would generate 11,000 jobs 
nationwide over six years, reaching a total of 18,000 jobs in the 1996-1997 timeframe when the 
aircraft would be delivered to Taiwan. 105  No significant congressional opposition developed as 
the deal materialized.  In a prepared statement by Dr. Natalie Goldring, the deputy director of the 
British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a pro-arms control independent 
research group, it was stated that “President Bush’s cynical attempts to buy off Texas is just too 
blatant, going to the factory gates and handing out jobs is not the right way to conduct our 
nation’s national security policy.”106  Although he eventually lost the election, his overt use of 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to satisfy influential advocates and beneficiaries of the United States’ 
domestic industry worked, but larger strategic implications for U.S. foreign policy would 
develop as a consequence. 
 Taiwan’s procurement of the F-16 categorically violated the content of the 1982 U.S.-
PRC joint communiqué on arms sales by overtly increasing the quantity and quality of U.S. arms 
                                                 
104 Although President Bush used the PRC’s reported acquisition of 72 Su-27 fighter and 24 MiG-31 aircrafts in the 
1992 to justify his decision on selling Taiwan 150 F-16 A/Bs in 1992, the PRC only acquired 26 Su-27 fighter 
aircrafts, including 2 Su-27UB trainer versions, which were delivered in the year 1992.  Jyotsna Bakshi, Institute for 
Defence Studies & Analyses, Russian-China Military-Technical Cooperation: Implications for India.  Available 
[Online]. <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-100.html  > [18 December 2001]. 
105 “Bush Okays Sales of F-16 to Taiwan; Sale of 150 F-6A/B Aircraft”, Defense Daily, 176 no. 45 (1992), p. 355. 




sold to Taiwan.  Prior to President Bush’s decision, FMS had not exceeded $710 million and was 
widely regarded as being near or beneath the ceiling amount set by the United States in 1983.  
This indicated that the United States clearly intended to establish a long and enduring 
relationship with Taiwan, effectively linking the escalatory nature of the PRC’s modernization 
effort with the procurement of future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
a.  F-16 Fighting Falcon 
In 2002 Taiwan finally commissioned both wings of its F-16 fleet, bringing them into full 
service, and it is reported that President Chen Shui-bian vowed to maintain pace with the 
Chinese arms build up.  He also stated that, “we have no intention to engage in an arms race…  
We only hope to establish strategic stability in the Taiwan Strait.”107  These remarks were made 
in the context of the June 2000 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China” published by the U.S. Department of Defense.  This report stressed that, 
In the long term (2010-2020), China’s quantitative edge over Taiwan’s military 
forces will increase…After 2005, however, if projected trends continue, the 
balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China’s 
favor, assuming no significant, concurrent improvement in Taiwan’s air 
capabilities.108 
 
In light of the report’s findings some of the weaponry that the Taiwan has already procured, such 
as the F-16, possess a substantial growth capability109 and a high degree of integration110 that 
                                                                                                                                                             
106 Ibid., p. 355. 
107 Daily Report 18 December 2001.  Available [Online]. <http://NAPSNet@nautilus.org  > [18 December 2001]. 
108 U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm > 
109 “According to a representative at the Lockheed Martin Corporation, growth capability is defined as the F-16s 
ability to integrate new avionic systems, sensors, and weapons. Growth parameters are usually defined by: weight, 
space, cooling, electrical power, data bus capacity, and computing capacity. Some of these capabilities (such as most 
new weapons) can be integrated with just a software changes to the core avionics computers, i.e., no hardware 
change to the aircraft itself.”  Context of the statement was received via email from Michael J. Nipper 
(Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on January 31, 2002. 
110 “Integradability encompasses both the amount of development and modification effort required to incorporate 
new systems and stores on the F-16. In this regard, it is very accommodating, particularly because it has the ability 




must be exploited in order to help Taiwan maintain the balance of air power across the strait.  
This is best exemplified through an upgrade similar to the F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade that Taiwan’s 
fleet of F-16s received and through another upgrade (M3) that is currently being sold to 
European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) that can easily be adapted for the Taiwan’s fleet of F-
16s. 
(1)  F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) 
Originally the F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) was designed strictly for NATO aircraft, 
but following extensive complaints lodged by Taiwan about the F-16 A/B’s inability to 
adequately fulfill its defensive requirements, the U.S. government sold the Taiwan an upgrade 
similar to the F-16 MLU.  The F-16 Block 20, which Taiwan started receiving in 1997 has a 
standard avionics configuration that is similar to F-16 MLU.  It includes a modular mission 
computer,111 color digital displays112 and the AN/APX-111 identification friend or foe system 
(IFF).113  Also, according to a representative of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, “the Block 20 
has some unique capabilities for the F-16A/B, such as being able carry the AIM-7 Sparrow air-
                                                                                                                                                             
received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on 
January 31, 2002. 
111 “The most important item of the Mid Life Update package is the Texas Instruments Modular Mission Computer 
(MMC) which is the key to providing new capabilities such as sensors and weapons, improved pilot-vehicle 
interface and pilot aiding….  It will replace three components, namely the computers currently in use for the 
Expanded Fire Control Computer (XFCC), the Head Up Display Electronics Unit (HUD EU or HUD symbol 
generator), and the Stores Management System's Expanded Central Interface Unit (XCIU). The MMC will take up 
42% less volume in the aircraft, weights 55% less and consumes 37% less electrical power. Of the 24 slots available 
in the computer, ten will be used for future growth.”  F-16.net Three-Four-Nine Homepage, F-16 MLU Mid-Life 
Update Program. 8 December 2000.  Available [Online]. <http://www.f-16.net/reference/versions/f16_mlu.html > 
[8 December 2001]. 
112 “The cockpit layout will be the one of the F-16C Block-40/50. However, unlike the Block-40/50 aircraft, the 
MLU F-16's will be equipped with color displays. The cockpit lighting will be compatible with Night Vision 
Imaging System (NVIS) and all visible surfaces will be painted black. The Night Vision goggles are deactivated in 
the HUD filed-of-view to allow inhibited HUD viewing.”  Ibid. <http://www.f-
16.net/reference/versions/f16_mlu.html >  
113 “The Hazeltine APX-111(V1) Advanced Identification Friend-or-Foe system (AIFF) with increased range 
performance (100 Nm) will operate via four (rather striking) antennas mounted on the upper forward fuselage in 
front of the canopy…  The benefits of this AIFF system will be the support for BVR weapons delivery in excess of 
Radar/Missile limits and the enhanced situational awareness which reduces the chance of a fratricide.”  Ibid.  




to-air missile and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile capability, compared to other versions 
of the F-16 A/B.”114  Taiwan is the only country that received this configuration, which made the 
F-16 A/B Block 20 a more capable combat platform than some of the early versions F-16C/D. 115 
By modifying the original components and airframe of Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s, its overall 
operational performance has been improved through increasing its reliability, supportability and 
maintainability.  In addition the upgrade brings the cockpit up to similar standards of later 
models of the F-16C/D. 116 Consequently, it has significantly enhanced Taiwan’s F-16s, 
capability to fire advanced weaponry and detect enemy aircraft at a greater distance.  Through 
this upgrade its fleet of F-16’s service life and combat capability have been considerably boosted 
to help maintain a deterrence balance in its air force. 
(2)  F-16 M3 Upgrade 
After Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s received the upgrade similar to the F-16 MLU, the 
Lockheed Martin Corporation designed and made provisions for the sales of a new modification 
kit that will be used in several EPAFs.  “These kits will be used to upgrade F-16s previously 
modified with the F-16A/B Mid-Life Update (MLU), and operated by the air forces of Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.”117  If trends continue and the balance of air power 
begins to shift in favor of the PRC, Taiwan will be able to purchase modifications similar to what 
the M3 kits offers for its fleet of F-16s.  Significant changes include: 
· “Link 16–secure, jam-resistant, high-volume, data communications that significantly 
increase pilot situation awareness.”118 
 
                                                 
114 Context of the statement was received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the 
Lockheed Martin Corporation on January 25, 2002. 
115 Ibid., (Michael. j.nipper@lmco.com) January 25, 2002. 
116 Ibid. <http://www.f-16.net/reference/versions/f16_mlu.html > 
117 Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Company Homepage, New Lockheed Martin Contract Will Significantly Upgrade 
Capability of European F-16s.  23 January 2002. Available [Online].  
<http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html  > [23 January 2002]. 




· “Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System–new U.S. helmet display for improved situation 
awareness and employment of high-off-boresight weapons.”119 
 
 
· “Upgraded processors and displays–[with] lower cost [and] improved supportability.”120 
 
· “U.S. family of new ‘smart weapons’–Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Stand-Off 
Weapon, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser–provide all-weather, precision attack 
from standoff distances.”121 
 
· “There are also enhancements to existing systems including the multimode radar, 
electronic warfare management system and reconnaissance pods.”122 
 
· “The MLU program shares a common avionics architecture and has extensive hardware 
and software commonality with the U.S. Air Force’s Common Configuration 
Implementation Program, a major cockpit and avionics upgrade to about 650 Block 40/50 
F-16C/Ds.”123 
 
Although some of these modifications are not currently applicable for non-NATO 
aircraft, they exemplify the F-16’s extraordinary growth capability and high levels of integration.  
As the PRC continues to buy more advanced weaponry from the Soviet Union, Taiwan will have 
the ability to continually upgrade its fleet of F-16s with more advanced sensors and weapons 
because these technological advances can be easily adapted for its aircraft.  In sum, the present 
level of technology that Taiwan possesses will help sustain the cross-strait balance of air power 
with its substantial growth capability and high level of technical and tactical integration over the 
long run (2010-2020).124 
                                                 
119 Ibid. <http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html >  
120 Ibid. <http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html >  
121 Ibid. <http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html >  
122 Ibid. <http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html >  
123 Ibid. <http://www.lmtas.com/news/programnews/combat_air/f16/f16_02/f16pr020123.html >  
124 “Currently the Lockheed Martin Corporation is working on an retrofit upgrade program for Taiwan’s F-16s that 
include: Global Position System, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, and a targeting pod 
capability (such as LANTIRN). This will give its [Taiwan’s] F-16s the advance capabilities for precision navigation, 
enhanced beyond-visual range intercept …[beyond the limited range of the AIM-7 air to air missile]… autonomous 
day/night precision strike with laser-guided weapons and target/weapon seeker cueing. There could be additional 
upgrades that may be made available for Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s in the future.”  Context of the statement was 
received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on 




In the defense of Taiwan against China, the F-16 would be the primary weapon system 
used to deflect or slow down PRC air assaults.  It is a compact multi- role fighter aircraft with 
fourth generation technology.  In addition, it is considered one of the world’s best fighter aircraft 
and a force multiplier, an aircraft that can perform either air-to-air or air-to-surface roles 
according to its weapon load-out.  In this context, the F-16’s versatility was demonstrated in 
Operation Desert Storm.   
During Desert Storm, 249 x F-16s of all models, flew approximately 13,500 
sorties with about 4,000 at night. The average sortie duration for F-16s was 3.24 
hours…F-16s were asked to perform combat air patrol, suppression of enemy air 
defenses, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air support (CAS) using 
LANTIRN navigational pod capability, deep air interdiction (AI), Wild Weasel 
escort, and forward air control (FAC) missions as well as psychological 
operations with pamphlet drops deep inside of Iraq. F-16 availability was very 
high having flown over 34% of the total USAF sorties and delivered thousands of 
tons of munitions. Very few sorties were lost to attrition or aborts.125 
 
Air power took a huge step forward in terms of credibility and perceived importance after the 
opening days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.126  The F-16’s high level of integration and 
operational readiness during Desert Storm coincides with Taiwan’s defensive needs and suggest 
that the potential effectiveness of its fleet of F-16s will be truly strategic during a crisis with the 
PRC. 
For Taiwan, the F-16 would be used as a fighter-bomber primarily because it does not 
possess any heavy bombers.127  In addition, it is a proven combat platform with superior 
maneuverability, a long combat radius (approximately 570 miles) and capable of carrying 
numerous air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, including the AIM-7 SPARROW and 
                                                 
125F-16 Combat Legacy, <http://www.f-16.net/library/legacy.html > 
126 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Role of Air Power Going Into the 21st Century.” Emerging Threats, Force 
Structures, and the Role of Air Power in Korea, ed.  Natalie W. Crawford and Chung-In Moon  (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2000), p. 115. Available [Online]. <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF152/ > [1 March 2002]. 
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HARPOON missiles.128  These capabilities significantly strengthen its air force’s defensive 
strategy, primarily because Taiwan has a limited amount of airspace to defend.  Although the 
PRC posses an overwhelming advantage in terms of its overall numbers, it would be impossible 
for the Chinese Communists to send all their aircraft over at once; each attack would be limited 
to 200 aircraft at the outside, attacking in a maximum of three waves a day. 129  According to 
military planners, this level of attack can be handled by Taiwan’s current air order of battle 
(AOOB).  These facts make the F-16 a formidable combat platform, but it would be particularly 
potent in an attack by the PRC because of the small airspace over Taiwan. 
b.  Kidd Class Destroyer 
 “A fundamental stability in the military balance and a very low profile have been the key 
features of U.S.-Taiwan military relations during the twenty some years of the Taiwan Relations 
Act.  Both these features are changing, however.”130  Economic imperatives and the impact that 
arms sales have on the arms industry are a primary concern of the Congress and the Executive 
branch, however the latest arms package destined for Taiwan is firmly linked to its real military 
needs and the Bush administration’s foreign policy initiatives.  In April 2001, Washington 
announced the largest and most comprehensive arms package to Taipei since 1992, which 
included four Kidd-class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and 12 P-3C submarine-hunting 
aircraft.  This deal, “which infuriated China, followed a two-year U.S. review of Taiwan's air 
force and navy.”131 
                                                 
128 Armament: One M-61A1 20mm multibarrel cannon with 500 rounds; external stations can carry up to six air-to-
air missiles, conventional air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions and electronic countermeasure pods.  U.S. Air 
Force Fact Sheet, F-16 Fighting Falcon. October 2001  Available [Online].  
<http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/F_16_Fighting_Falcon.html  > [01 December 2001].  
129 Shu-fen Hsieh, “Who Rules the Skies Over Taiwan?”  Sinorama ,  (May 1991), p. 13. 
130 Bellocchi., p. 158. 
131 Taiwan Security Research Homepage. Agence France Presse, Febuary 18, 2002. Taiwan U.S. Holds Rare 




The acquisition of these platforms is aimed at substantially boosting the Taiwanese 
Navy’s combat capability in accordance with its defense strategy and the findings of the DOD 
report to Congress on the military power of the PRC.  After these platforms are incorporated into 
Taiwan’s naval forces with existing equipment like the Lafayette class frigates that it acquired 
from France, Taiwan will be able to deploy four attack groups with the ability to hunt, detect, 
track and engage aircraft, surface and sub-surface vessels.   
According to Li Chieh-nien, commander of Taiwan’s navy, the significance of the Kidd-
class destroyer is monumental.  
In [the] future, we will form four attack groups centered on those warships of a 
new model and assign them such a task as ‘moving towards distant sea waters.’  If 
everything goes on smoothly, our navy is expected to receive all four missile 
destroyers; deploy the four attack groups mentioned above; and assign these 
groups such a task as "moving towards distant sea waters’ over the next three to 
five years in order to ‘counter a threat from the mainland's superior forces in 
2005.’132 
 
These ships are supposed to be delivered in 2003 and are the most powerful multi-purpose 
destroyers that the United States has to offer.  The Kidd is characterized as,  
· “A ship so quiet, and an ASW system so capable, that she operates offensively 
against submarines.”133 
 
· [Possessing] “the most sophisticated medium-range AAW systems in the Fleet, quick 
reacting and highly accurate, with the capability for today's air defense environment 
and the growth potential for tomorrows.”134 
 
· [Having] “an exceptionally reliable and responsive engineering plant.”135 
 
· [Having] “a deadly surface-to-surface weapons capability.”136 
 
                                                 
132 Xiao Yu. “Pro-Taiwan Forces in United States Again Cook Up Exercise for Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Beijing, 
Guangming Ribao , 2 February 2001. FBIS translated text.  Document ID: CPP20010207000061. [ PRC Paper on 
U.S. Pro-Taiwan Forces Pushing for Arms Sales to Taiwan.] 
133 Federation of American Scientist Homepage. DDG-993 Kidd-Class.  14 February 2000. Available [Online].  
 <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-993.htm > [14 January 2002]. 
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· “These characteristics make KIDD a triple-threat, one of the few truly multi-mission 
ships, able to operate offensively, to deal with simultaneous air, surface, and sub-
surface attacks.”137 
 
The Kidd-class destroyer’s operational capabilities are complemented by an equally as 
impressive armament package that includes:  the Standard missile138 (Mk-26 launcher); Harpoon 
surface-to-surface missiles139 (Mk-141 quad launcher), which are capable of over-the-horizon 
attacks on surface targets; Mk-46 torpedo140 (MK-32 triple tube mount); and a five inch 54 
caliber MK-45 gun.  These armaments make the Kidd-class destroyer a formidable combat 
platform and increase the Taiwan’s ability control its territorial waters and adds additional 
coverage for Taiwan’s limited amount of airspace. 
In addition to its robust armament package, the Kidd-class destroyer has an automated 
communication system and four radars that will enhance the ship’s ability to survive in combat 
operations.  These radars are the SPS-48 (air search), SPG-60 (gun fire control), SPS-55 (surface 
search) and the SPQ-9A (gun fire control).  Of the four different radars that the Kidd-class 
possesses, the SPS-48 is the most important because it is three-dimensional and allows the ship 
                                                 
137 Ibid. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-993.htm > 
138 “The Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is the Navy’s primary surface-to-air fleet defense weapon. The currently 
deployed SM-2 Block II/III/IIIA configurations are all-weather, ship-launched medium-range fleet air defense 
missiles derived from the SM-1 (RIM-GGB), which is still in the fleet. SM -2 employs an electronic 
countermeasures-resistant monopulse receiver for semi-active radar terminal guidance and inertial midcourse 
guidance capable of receiving midcourse command updates from the shipboard fire control system.  RIM-66/RIM-
67 Standard Missile.”  Federation of American Scientist Homepage. RIM-66/RIM-67 Standard Missile. [DDG-993 
Kidd-Class.]. 18 April 1999. Available [Online]. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/sm-2.htm > [18 
January 2002].  
139 The Harpoon's active radar guidance, warhead design, and low-level, sea-skimming cruise trajectory assure high 
survivability and effectiveness. The missile is capable of being launched from surface ships, submarines, or (without 
the booster) from aircraft. United States Navy. Fact File. Harpoon Missile. Available [Online].   
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-harp.html > [March 1, 2002]. 
140 The MK-46 torpedo is designed to attack high performance submarines, and is presently identified as the NATO 
standard. The MK-46 torpedo is designed to be launched from surface combatant torpedo tubes, ASROC missiles 
and fixed and rotary wing aircraft. In 1989, a major upgrade program began to enhance the performance of the MK-
46 Mod 5 in shallow water. Weapons incorporating these improvements are identified as Mod 5A and Mod 5A(S). 
The MK-46 Mod 5 torpedo is the backbone of the Navy's lightweight ASW torpedo inventory and is expected to 
remain in service until the year 2015.  Federation of American Scientist Homepage. MK 46 Torpedo. [DDG-993 
Kidd-Class]. 12 December 1998.  Available [Online]. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk -46.htm 




to command a wide area of ocean to defend the other ships in the attack group.141  According to 
Jane’s Defense Weekly,  
…a Kidd-class destroyer, which is more than twice the size of the largest warship 
Taiwan's navy has at the moment, is capable of directing an air defense platform, 
an antisubmarine platform, as well as a surface combat platform on the sea.   
Equipped with both the advanced Standard SM-2ER missiles and the 3D radar in 
their ‘combat systems,’ Kidd-class destroyers are bound to help Taiwan's navy 
‘make a giant stride forward’ in terms of fighting capacity and raise its fleets’ air 
defense capability on the sea as well.142 
 
Procurement of the Kidd-class destroyer creates a new set of complexities for the PRC because 
the Kidd-class destroyer can be easily integrated into an Aegis-equipped warship’s weapons 
network.  The Kidd-class destroyer was designed so that an Aegis-equipped warship could help 
control and fire its missiles. 
The Kidd-class destroyer will be used as a potential transitional platform for Taiwan’s 
navy to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, which is equipped with Aegis radar system because, 
…The United States Department of Defense Evaluation Report considers the 
Aegis a need for Taiwan -- the Kidd warships can act as a transitory program for 
training Taiwan naval personnel to receive the Aegis warships.  There are even 
United States officials that suggest that the United States navy first purchase an 
additional four Aegis warships and transfer them to Taiwan for use after waiting 
for their completion. 143 
 
                                                 
141 The Radar Set AN/SPS-48E is a long-range, three-dimensional, air-search radar system that provides contact 
range, bearing, and height information to be displayed on consoles/workstations. This is accomplished by using a 
frequency-scanning antenna which emits a range of different frequencies in the E/F band (10cm). The AN/SPS-48C 
Radar system is a complete system including all component elements - Transmitter, Receiver, Computer (Radar and 
Automatic Detection and Tracking), Frequency Synthesizer and Height Display Indicator. The AN/SPS-48E uses a 
combination of mechanical scanning in azimuth and electronic beam-steering in elevation to provide plan position 
and height information on targets. Radar videos, converted to digital format, are displayed on consoles/workstations 
to provide a means for the operators to perform manual radar search, detection and tracking functions. Radar triggers 
and antenna bearings are used to properly display radar video data on the consoles/workstations. True bearing 
indications are displayed on the consoles/workstations to indicate whether the track position is displayed in 
relationship to ownship or true north.  Federation of American Scientist Homepage. AN/SPS-48C Radar. [DDG-993 
Kidd-Class]. 30 June 1999. Available [Online]. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-sps-48.htm > 
[30 January 2002]. 
142 Xiao Yu.  
143Cao Yufen. “The United States Will Perhaps Agree to See Diesel Submarines to Taiwan.” Taipeo Tzu-Yu Shih-
Pao, 20 April 2001. FBIS translation. Document ID: CPP20010420000055 .  [Officials' Predict Results of US Arms 




In response to the PRC’s perceived threat as articulated by the June 2000 report on the military 
power of the PRC, Taiwan plans on ultimately acquiring an Aegis-equipped warship.  Although 
the PRC has explicitly stated that the procured an Aegis-equipped warship by Taiwan would 
seriously harm Sino-U.S. relationships, this clearly is the direction in which the United States 
and Taiwan plan to proceed. 
D.  DETERRING THE PRC 
 The deterrent power of conventional weapons is based primarily upon their ability to 
affect the aggressor country’s political calculus.  The conventional deterrent provided by U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan to maintain its self-defenses is only one of the essential elements required 
to create a credible deterrent to PRC aggression toward Taiwan.  A credible deterrent is set up 
through a complex relationship in which country X, which is supplying the arms, will support 
country Y in ways such as arms sales and the threat of immediate military assistance in a crisis 
that convinces country Z, who is the aggressor, not to attack country Y.  This relationship is set 
up to affect a country’s political calculus, convincing the leadership of country Z, the aggressor, 
that the cost or risk will be greater than the expected benefits of its actions in terms of military, 
economic and political factors. 
Also affecting the PRC’s political calculus is the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity.”  
This tactic, along with weapon sales to Taiwan, does not commit the United States to militarily 
assist Taiwan in a crisis with the PRC, although President George W. Bush’s statement on April 
26, 2001 lent credence to full U.S. support of Taiwan in a crisis under certain circumstances.144  
Later, President Bush and other high-ranking officials modified his statement and insisted that 
the United States did not intend to change its policy on Taiwan.  Even though this policy has left 
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Taiwan with only an ambiguous deterrent, it continues to pay huge dividends in the cross-strait 
relationship because Beijing has to consider U.S. involvement in a crisis.  
On the one hand, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have clearly increased its self-defense 
capability and added to the complexity of a feasible attack by the PRC.145  Conversely, they have 
lessened the long-term prospect of peace by adding significant impetus to a new arms race in 
Asia. 
Many analysts and strategists consider war between China and Taiwan to be 
inevitable.  But the possibility that China will decide to use military force to 
achieve reunification, whether or not Taiwan declares independence, requires a 
measure of examination and reflection. 146 
 
In view of this, the U.S. goals defined by the 2000 DOD “Report on Implementation of Taiwan 
Relations Act” have diverged, thus limiting the tangible value of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  
Within this divergence Taiwan still possesses a limited degree of international military and 
political autonomy, which is indicative of the Taiwan authorities’ survival.  But, at least 
theoretically, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have potentially decreased its cross-strait stability.  This 
conclusion, however, assumes that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have increased the PRC’s 
propensity to isolate Taiwan politically and increased the efficacy of using military force against 
Taiwan to achieve reunification. 
E.  CROSS STRAITS MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER 
Since the abrogation of the of the formal defense treaty between the United States and 
Taiwan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under the guidance of the TRA have served as a defacto 
                                                 
145 This proposition assumes that Taiwan has fully assimilated most of the newly acquired weapon systems .  
“Assimilation refers to the process that takes place between the adoption of a weapon and its use as a fully 
integrated component of an existing arsenal: that is, the weapon must be absorbed into the tactics, doctrine, and 
organizational structure of the military establishment.”  See Christopher S. Parker, “New Weapons for Old 
Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States,” International Security , 23, 
no. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 121. 




defense treaty.  An aggregate measure of this defacto defense treaty has often been expressed in 
terms of the cross strait military balance of power. 
The fundamental question for assessment is whether the military balance is or is 
not satisfactory in relation to those U.S. goals. The overarching U.S. goal is to 
avoid any use or threat of force to resolve differences in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, 
our goals include that the PRC be persuaded against or deterred from attacking or 
threatening attack, that if a threat is made it is unavailing, and that if an attack is 
made it is unsuccessful.147 
 
In relation to these goals, Taiwan’s deterrence balance in its air force and navy must be visibly 
maintained by the United States in terms of arms sold to Taiwan in order to persuade or deter the 
PRC from threatening attack or attacking.  Recently, President Chen Shui-bian stated, “the 
modernization of communist China's military poses threat to our national security.  Therefore, 
we must constantly upgrade our weapon system.”148  Thus, what Taiwan perceives as a level of 
arms necessary for the maintenance of its basic security is viewed by the PRC as a threat to its 
national security, creating a security dilemma.   
1.  PRC Modernization 
a.  Military Strategy 
It is now generally accepted that Taiwan is the major motivating force behind the 
modernization and restructuring of the Chinese military.  Presently the PRC espouses the belief 
that it possesses the tactics, means and methods to successfully employ force against Taiwan 
designed to politically shock and to psychologically and economically distress or overwhelm 
Taiwan in a decisive war.  The crux of this belief is founded in Mao Zedong’s revolutionary 
                                                 
147 Taiwan Studies Institute. (December 2000) “Pentagon Report on Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act.” 
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doctrinal writings on national military strategy called people’s war.  It was developed during the 
Chinese Civil War (1927-1937, 1945-1949) and the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945).149 
Although, the PRC never fought such a war after 1949, this concept nevertheless, 
presumably guided the PRC’s preparation for a future war in the 1960s, as reflected in the 
economic development of the “third front.”  After Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC’s 
military strategy started to evolve, though grudgingly at times, from a “people’s war” to a  
“people’s war under modern conditions” in the early 1980’s to a “local, limited war” strategy 
from 1985-1991.  Thus in 1985, responding to its new military strategy, the PRC initiated a 
modernization effort with the fundamental aim of moving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
away from its traditionally large, unwieldy force structure to a smaller, more efficient one that 
would be primarily devoted to the PRC’s foreign policy and territorial integrity. 
b.  The Gulf War 
By the early 1990s there was a new development that loomed large in the PRC’s evolving 
military strategy, and that was the 1991 Gulf War.  “The devastation of Iraq’s Soviet-design 
equipment highlighted the lethality of high-tech weapons and their ability to bring a conflict to a 
rapid conclusion.”150  Consequently, the Gulf War showed the PRC, despite being stronger than 
most of its neighbors militarily, that its forces were ill equipped to fight such a war.  The PRC’s 
forces lacked modern high-tech platforms and advanced weaponry that such a war would require, 
and its troops were insufficiently trained.  Thus, the emphasis in the PRC’s evolving military 
strategy shifted from being able to fight a “local, limited war” to being able to fight a “local war 
under high- tech conditions” after 1991.   
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2.  People’s Liberation Army’s Present Capabilities 
The PLA is the largest conventional force in East Asia, and its modernization must be 
viewed in terms of its geopolitical ambitions.   
China’s primary national goal is to become a strong, modernized, unified, and 
wealthy nation. It views its national standing in relation to the position of other 
"great powers." Beijing clearly wants to be recognized as a full- fledged great 
power. China considers itself a developing power whose natural resources, 
manpower, nuclear-capable forces, seat on the UN Security Council, and growing 
economy give it most of the attributes of a great power.151 
 
In addition to its infantry, the PLA has three other service members152--the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAAF), People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Strategic Missile 
Force (SMF)-- which collectively total 2,480,000153 active duty members.  Traditionally the 
PLAN and PLAAF assumed subordinate roles and were considered mere appendages of the PLA 
in the past, which was also reflected in their meager military budgets.  But the PRC’s shift in 
military strategy from a “limited local war” to  “a local war under high- tech conditions” provided 
the impetus for these largely relegated forces to emerge with important redefined roles in the 
PRC’s ambitious foreign policy and national goals.   
The PLA’s large size and light infantry emphasis, which it inherited from the “people’s 
war” era, has hindered the PRC’s modernization effort in the post-Mao era. Nevertheless, the 
military reforms initiated in 1985 demarcated the PLA’s transition from an antiquated 
quantitative force to a qualitative force with emerging capabilities.  “The major objective for 
China now is to build its capacity in fighting a high-tech war.  China will focus on improving the 
quality (technological advancements) of its defense rather than maintaining numerical superiority 
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in weaponry and military personnel.”154  Force restructuring and reductions, new equipment 
acquisitions, and a growing military budget have been boosted by a strong economy.  The once 
revolutionary PLA of old has been transformed into one of East Asia’s most powerful regional 
threats, with an immediate goal of gaining a decisive advantage in the cross-strait military 
balance of power and countering Taiwan’s perceived separatist ambition.  If the current levels of 
modernization are maintained, the PLA could potentially emerge as a credible global threat by 
the middle of the 21st century. 155 
3.  Force Reductions 
In transforming the PLA from a traditionally large and unwieldy force structure to a 
smaller, more efficient one, the PLA has undergone force reductions.  Starting in 1985, the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) announced a reduction of one million personnel.  At the 
time, this was a 25% reduction of the PLA’s overall force of approximately 4,000,000.  Next, in 
1998, another massive force cut was announced which would further reduce the PLA’s 
manpower level by another 500,000 before 2002.156  In just over 15 years, the PLA’s forces will 
be reduced to approximately 2.5 million members.  Chinese leaders viewed reducing the massive 
size of the PLA as the prime mover in the modernization effort and that more force reductions 
will continue to occur well into the 21st century as the PLA becomes a more modernized force.  
The additional savings will be re-allocated back into the PLA’s modernization process for higher 
quality forces and more technically advanced equipment, such as the 1992 acquisition of the Su-
27. 
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4.  Military Budget 
Since the end of the Cold War, most countries have tried to reduce their military budgets, 
but the PRC has continually increased its military budget since the early 1980s.  The increases in 
the PLA’s military budget have been the most reliable factor in its modernization effort, because 
its military prowess has been boosted by the PRC’s economic growth.  Leaders in Beijing have 
continually declared that the military’s growth is subordinate to the PRC’s economic growth and 
that relationship will endure.   But most Western analysts believe that if the PRC’s phenomenal 
economic growth slows or declines, the PRC will continue to aggressively invest in the PLA’s 
modernization effort because percentage increases in military spending in the past several years 
have exceeded the growth in GDP.157 
Although Beijing has begun to publish an official military budget figure in an attempt to 
increase transparency and build confidence, analysts generally estimate that the actual figure is 
between one and a half to five times higher.  Also, there are analysts at the extreme end of the 
spectrum who estimate it could be between 10 to 20 times higher, but for all practical purposes 
most mainstream analysts believe it is about three times higher than the published figure.  
Consequently, the future of the PLA’s modernization effort is gaining prominence.158  The PRC 
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decided to increase defense spending in 2001 by 17.7 percent, which is the biggest expansion in 
real terms in the last 20 years, according China’s Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng. 159   
5.  PLAAF 
Currently the PLAAF and PLAN are well behind the technological power curve of Japan 
and Taiwan, its regional neighbors.  At the outset of the reform period, Deng Xiaoping identified 
the pressing need for air force modernization and even boldly claimed that the Air Force might 
be the most important element in the modernization effort.160  Although the PLAAF’s huge 
inventory consists of 5,300 combat aircraft,161 the vast majority of these aircraft are of vintage 
1950s era Soviet design.  Against a fourth generation U.S. fighter such as the 150 F-16s sold to 
Taiwan, these aircraft would have little or no chance of combat success because they lack 
adequate maneuverability, combat radius, radar support and air-to-air weapons. But, during the 
early 1990s the PRC began to purchase relatively high-tech combat platforms such as the Su-27, 
an equivalent of the F-16, from Russia to maintain the cross-strait military balance of power with 
Taiwan.  Also, Beijing has made it clear that it wants to ensure its future dominance in the 
Taiwan Strait by importing the more advanced Su-30-MK fighter.  The end result of the process 
of modernization is to ultimately reduce overall numbers and improve the PLAAF combat 
potential, which is beginning to materialize. 
6.  PLAN 
The PLA’s vast modernization effort has improved the PLAN’s combat capabilities in 
limited areas.  However, the PLAN is still heavily reliant on a fleet of mostly obsolete Soviet-
designed platforms from the 1950s and 1960s.  In trying to compensate for the lack of quality 
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platforms and weapons systems, the PLAN maintains some 60 destroyers and frigates, about 60 
diesel and six nuclear submarines, and nearly 50 amphibious landing ships, which makes it one 
of the largest navies in East Asia.  Due to the lack of a sufficient number of modern surface 
combatants, submarines, and a comprehensive modernization program, the PLAN will remain a 
coastal defense navy (brown water navy) well into the 21st century. 
Through indigenous development and foreign acquisition, the PLA is selectively 
upgrading the PLAN’s weaponry and equipment in a pattern consistent with operational 
demands of “local war under high tech conditions.”  During the 1990s, the PLAN commissioned 
two indigenously produced classes of surface combatants.  The first one was the 4,500-ton Luhu 
class guided missile destroyer, and the second was the 2,750-ton Jiangwei class guided missile 
frigate.  The Chinese are also working on a third, the Luhai class destroyer, which will weigh 
over 6,000 tons and be equipped with C-802 missiles with a range of 120 km. 162 The 
conceptualization and arrival of these ships represent a marked improvement over previous 
classes of ships developed in the 1970s and 1980s.  “Nevertheless, the PLAN continues to lag 
behind other regional navies, including that of Taiwan, in most technological areas, especially air 
defense, C4I, and surveillance.”163 
 Also, the PRC’s foreign acquisition program has further enhanced the PLAN’s arsenal by 
acquiring four Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with SS-N-22 (Sunburn) missiles164 and Kilo-
class diesel submarines.  The Sovremenny-class destroyers, which have been dubbed the PRC’s 
carrier killer, gives the PLAN a credible surface combatant, and the Kilo-class submarines 
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significantly improved the PLAN’s ability to conduct coastal defense and blockade operations.  
The new emphasis placed on the PLAN reflects changes not only in China’s military strategy, 
but also in its perceptions of the importance of the sea as a strategic resource and cross-strait 
battleground. 
7.  Strategic Missile Force 
The SMF has always been one of the PLA’s top military budget priorities.  This was 
demonstrated in 1985 during the initial phase of the PLA modernization effort, when the SMF 
was expanded while the other services were reduced by the demobilization of one million 
troops.165  Retired Admiral Eric A. McVadon notes that “the PLA excels in very few warfare 
areas, but one of them is its arsenal of short- medium - range ballistic missiles – primarily (but 
necessarily) tipped with conventional warheads.”166  The SMF, or Second Artillery, is a highly 
capable regional force that provides the PRC a credible second-strike nuclear capability and will 
inevitably be used to spearhead all of the PLA’s strategic military operations and above all its 
campaign to reunite Taiwan, as was demonstrated in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 
1995 and 1996. 
Most of the SMF’s tactical and strategic missiles are not very accurate in terms of their 
circular error probability (CEP) when compared to U.S. missiles.  The PLA is currently 
developing new ballistic, cruise and anti-missile systems that will replace aging systems and also 
increase accuracy.  Foreign technology will be used when possible to create better warheads and 
guidance systems as Beijing’s efforts shift from creating better nuclear warheads to creating 
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better conventional warheads with more accurate delivery systems.  According to a 1996 report 
by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessments, by the year 2010 China could 
have as many as 2,000 conventionally armed missiles with varying ranges, some of which could 
reach as far as Guam. 167  A marked increase in range, numbers and accuracy of the SMF’s 
missile order of battle (MOOB) will ultimately offset some of the inadequacies of the other 
services in a war with Taiwan. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
According to the June 2000 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China”, currently the cross strait balance of military power is satisfactory in view of 
U.S. goals.  It continues by suggesting that Taiwan does not face an imminent threat of war 
because the expected economic, social and political cost/risk of attacking Taiwan outweighs the 
expected benefits for the party who initiates the war.  This was demonstrated in the PRC’s 1979 
war with Vietnam, in which the degree of resistance was underestimated and was never fully 
contained by the PRC.168  From this vantage point, post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have 
created a sufficient cross-strait military balance of power and are a politically stabilizing factor in 
the cross-strait relationship. 
However, post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are the primary means of persuading or 
deterring the PRC from attacking Taiwan, and the PRC’s modernization effort is what 
continually alters the cross strait balance of military power.  Thus,  
Deterrence is a policy which, if it succeeds, can only frustrate an opponent who 
aspires to changing the international status quo in his favor.  The consequence of 
continued frustration, however, are not easily predicted and are not necessarily 
benign…One possibility is that continued frustration under conditions that are 
imperfectly understood may indeed lead an opponent to abandon the objectives or 
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modify the means of pursuing them that have contributed to conflict or 
tension…Another possibility, of course, is that deterrence gives the opposing 
parties time to work out an accommodation of their conflicting interests, thereby 
reducing tensions and the potential for overt conflicts in their relationship.169   
 
As this reciprocating relationship continues to escalate without resolution, the PRC’s claim to 
Taiwan as its sovereign territory and its “sovereign right” of the use of force have became more 
stridently articulated.  Consequently, from this view U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have appreciably 
decreased Taiwan’s political stability because they both have abandoned the political and 
diplomatic aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and emphasized the military dimension. 
Also, in any relationship, time is a valuable commodity and this is especially true in the 
cross-strait relationship, since this present relationship has endured for over twenty years.  As the 
number of years continues to increase, so has the level of hostility and militarization, thus 
increasing the PRC’s frustration. 
The most reliable benefit successful deterrence can offer is more time—time in 
which some of the conflict generating or conflict-exacerbating elements in a 
historical situation can abate, so that deterrence will no longer be necessary or, at 
any rate, so critical for the maintenance of peace.170 
   
This phenomenon has not occurred and deterrence is increasingly needed to maintain peace in 
the cross-strait relationship.  This reciprocal relationship has increased conflict generating and 
exacerbating elements in the cross-strait relationship.  The overarching U.S. goal is to avoid any 
uses or threat of force to resolve differences in the Taiwan Strait, but U.S. arms sales have 
increased the PRC’s level of frustration through a security dilemma that has significantly 
contributed to an increased probability of conflict and tension over time. 
Consequently, in the post-Cold War environment, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has 
changed very little.  In spite of the vast amount of weaponry purchased from the U.S., Taiwan’s 
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armed forces do not possess the military hardware required to endure a long-term (more than 90 
days) military engagement with the PRC without U.S. intervention.  Although arms sales have 
increasingly been used for political purposes, experience suggests that such sales are no 
substitute for solid diplomacy and policy-making with friends, as well as foes.  In light of this, 
the United States has a strong interest in encouraging both sides to re-energize the political and 
diplomatic aspects of their relationship and de-emphasize the military dimension, ultimately to 


















IV.  Beijing’s Approach to U.S. Arms to Taiwan 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are currently the most controversial issue in PRC-American 
relations.  They crept to the forefront of Chinese-American relations as the PRC’s goal of 
reunification with Taiwan gained more prominence in the 1970s and early 1980s.  Subsequent to 
the U.S. establishment of diplomatic relationships with the PRC on January 1, 1979, which 
allowed the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to be answered at a later date, PRC diplomacy 
has failed to reach a definitive resolution with Washington pertaining to arms sales to Taiwan. 
Despite its diplomatic failures, the PRC remains committed to the peaceful reunification 
of Taiwan under the concept of “one country two systems” formula and insists that U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan are one of the remaining hurdles.  According to its 2000 White Paper, “The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” the PRC declared that: 
No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to 
Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries 
maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non- interference in 
each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping 
Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.171 
Beijing sees U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a flagrant violation of these principles, but the 
PRC does not currently exhibit any signs of downgrading or ending diplomatic relations 
with the United States. 
In practice, the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) regulates U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, an 
American legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1979.  But, from the PRC vantage point, 
the 1982 joint communiqué, an interna tional agreement negotiated by the Reagan 
Administration, stipulates an eventual end to all U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.  “In the Chinese 
                                                 




political context, international law is believed to have precedence over a country’s domestic 
law.”172  Beijing firmly believes that the U.S. has not honored its commitment of gradually 
decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, as prescribed by 
the 1982 joint communiqué, and suspects Washington of being committed to its defacto 
independence. 
B.  FACTORS SHAPING BEIJING’S APPROACH 
Given Beijing’s failed diplomatic efforts, symbolized by the ineffective 1982 joint 
communiqué, Beijing has resorted to a foreign policy approach that is intended to persuade the 
U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or to neutralize their aggregate effect.  This approach is 
multifaceted and complex, and it directly reflects the numerous interests that Beijing has in 
Taiwan.  Although there are numerous factors that have shaped Beijing’s foreign policy 
approach toward U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, the historical context of this issue, Beijing’s 
territorial claims, and its security interest have the most influence on its foreign policy approach. 
1.  Historical Context 
“In few countries does history play a greater role than in China.”173  Beijing views U.S. 
arm sales to Taiwan as one of the last obstacles that must be cleared before the inevitable 
reunification--a sacred goal left over from an unfinished civil war--will occur.  In view of this, 
U.S. arm sales raise questions about Beijing’s political legitimacy with respects to Taiwan and 
acts as a galvanizing force that unifies the Chinese people’s sentiment with the government 
against the United States.  Consequently, this issue has become extremely sensitive, to the degree 
that it is considered an inevitable, sacred national goal that will complete China’s national 
“liberation.”  In this context, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan demand the attention of PRC policy-
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makers at the highest level.  They believe that “[t]he U.S. does not want to see a strong and 
unified China.”174  Furthermore, Washington “considers Taiwan as not only ‘an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier’ in containing China, but also a card in protecting its strategic interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region.”175  Thus, from a domestic standpoint, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan are seen 
exclusively as a countervailing force that has prevented China from reaching its true strength 
through national unification. 
2.  Territorial Claim 
In Beijing’s view, the PRC’s sovereign territorial claim has been indefinitely delayed by 
U.S. arm sales to Taiwan because these arm sales embolden Taiwan’s independence movement.  
Beijing believes that Taiwan uses the relative nature and disposition of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan 
as a gauge of how much the U.S. supports its separatist activities, which has totaled over 20 
billion dollars in the past 19 years.  No matter how this issue is viewed, 20 billion dollars worth 
of military equipment signals an exceptionally high degree of support for Taiwan’s separatist 
activities.  Without the stoppage of U.S. military arm sales to Taiwan, it is unlikely that the ROC 
will cease its separatist activities and resolutely opt for reunification with the mainland. 
3.  Security 
Also, Beijing has a considerable security interest in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because 
the procurement of these defensive weapons has significantly increased Taiwan’s defensive 
capability.  Over the past 19 years under the authority of the TRA, Taiwan has received more 
than $20 billion worth of defense weaponry, primarily from the United States.  As discussed in 
previous chapter, U.S. arms transfers have helped transform Taiwan’s armed forces into one of 
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the most technologically advanced forces in the Asia-Pacific and a credible deterrent to the 
mainland’s use of military force. 
In addition, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan act as a de facto defense treaty under the guise of 
the TRA.  According to section 3 (b) of the TRA, 
The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such 
defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of 
Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law.  Such determination of 
Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities 
in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress. 
 
Beijing’s strategic calculation for reunifying Taiwan, thus consolidating its territorial claim, has 
been indefinitely delayed by this de facto relationship as the U.S. conducts annual reviews of 
Taiwan’s defensive needs.  In view of this relationship, Beijing interprets U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan as an effort to deviate from the stipulations in the joint communiqué on the establishment 
of diplomatic relationships between the PRC and the United States regarding terminating the 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. 
The collective weight of these three factors helps define Beijing’s approach and current 
level of diplomatic intensity toward U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.  However, the most influential 
factor is Beijing’s security concern, fo llowed by its territorial claim, and lastly by the historical 
context of this issue.  Beijing’s security concern is the most important simply because it is 
tangible.  U.S. arm sales have modernized Taiwan’s military forces and helped them evolve into 
a credible deterrent to mainland aggression.  As Taiwan’s military has modernized, China has 
embarked on a modernization effort of its own designed to neutralize the affects of Taiwan’s 
weapon procurements.  Without U.S. arm sales to Taiwan the “Taiwan question” would no 




would still be capable of fighting the PLA, the open-ended support from the United States would 
be null and void, leaving it to fend for itself. 
C.  INSTRUMENTS AND CHANNELS 
To respond to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the early to mid-1980s, Beijing has used a 
broad range of instruments and channels to address this issue.  These instruments and channels 
include, but are not limited to, increasing pressure on the ROC on Taiwan, public criticism of 
U.S. policy, official protests to Washington, military modernization (engaging in indigenous 
military research and development), and acquiring arms from abroad.  This comprehensive 
approach has not been effective in dissuading the U.S. from selling arms to Taiwan. 
1.  Propaganda Campaign  
Since the enactment of the TRA and the failed diplomatic efforts to enforce the 1982 
joint communiqué, Beijing has waged a propaganda campaign that explicitly criticizes U.S. arm 
sales to Taiwan.  These propaganda attacks were significantly enhanced in 1992 after the sale of 
150 F-16 aircrafts to Taiwan.  Hence, the rhetoric of this campaign describes recent U.S. arm 
sales to Taiwan as overtly violating the agreed terms of the 1982 joint communiqué and 
extending its hegemonic threat to China’s sovereignty.  As a result, the PLA has actively 
advocated intensifying these propaganda attacks and taking a harder line toward the U.S. as a 
defense against these hegemonic incursions.176 
2.  International Recognition 
Also, as a means of dealing with U.S. arms sales, Beijing has adamantly proclaimed PRC 
legitimacy as the sole government of China of which Taiwan is a part. 
                                                 




[For] Beijing, preventing the de jure separation of Taiwan from the mainland is 
inextricably linked to regime legitimacy and, therefore, survival.  It is an issue 
over which Beijing might very well engage in combat, even if it stood to lose, and 
in its 1998 white paper China’s National Defense, Beijing declared that selling 
weapons to Taipei ‘threatens China’s security.’177 
Thus, Beijing insists that the reunification of Taiwan is an internal matter that does not warrant 
any foreign interference.  At the heart of this statement are the principles of mutual respect of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- interference in other's internal affairs.  From Beijing’s 
perspective, the continuation of U.S. arms sales flagrantly violates international principles and 
norms that all sovereign nations rightfully possess.  After the French sold Taiwan 60 Mirage 
aircraft in early 1990s, this approach has bolstered the international support for Beijing’s cause 
and helped dissuade all countries except the United States from selling arms to Taiwan. 178  In 
sum, Beijing expects that recognition of these international principles will pressure the United 
States review its arms sales to Taiwan and facilitate there stoppage, thus, increasing the pressure 
on Taiwan to capitulate. 
3.  Military Modernization (Indigenous Military Research and Development (R&D)  
In response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, the PLA has vigorously engaged in a widespread 
process of military modernization to improve its overall combat potential.  This has been the 
Chinese’s high command’s main preoccupation.  Since, 1985 the number of active duty troops 
have declined, the number of combat aircraft and warships have remained relatively the same, 
but fire power, accuracy, missiles and the ability to respond more efficiently and effectively to 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait have been improved, thus improving survivability as well.  Although 
the military modernization is an ongoing process, significant weakness and lack of resources will 
continue to limit the PLA’s ability to realize the full combat potential of its new indigenous and 
                                                 
177 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relationships, 1989-2000  (Berkeley : 




foreign acquisitions for some years to come.  But, in terms of its military strength compared to 
Taiwan, this program has given the PRC a significant advantage in missile technology. 
4.  Foreign Acquisitions 
Additionally, as a part of the PLA modernization effort, Beijing began a foreign 
acquisitions program, which primarily sought to acquire tactical platforms instead of strategic 
defense systems to maintain the cross-strait power balance.  This fact stands out when a number 
of the PRC highly publicized weapon deals with the Russia are looked at.  These included the 
purchase in 1992 of the SA-10 anti-air missiles (S-300) system, the PLAAF’s purchase in 1992 
of the 26 SU-27 (Flanker) air-superiority fighter with production licenses, and the PLAN’s 
purchase in 1992 of in four Kilo class submarines and the purchase in 1996 of two Sovremenny 
class destroyers with Moskit surface-to-surface missiles.179  So far, there is no clear evidence that 
the PRC has acquired a significant power-projection capability (i.e. aircraft carrier, long-range 
bomber or large-scale amphibious forces), although there can be little doubt that recent 
acquisitions are increasing the range, accuracy and lethality of the PRC’s combat platforms 
compared to Taiwan.  Its indigenous and foreign acquisition programs have been relatively 
effective in creating pockets of excellence and neutralizing the aggregate effects of U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan. 
D.  PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS 
Beijing’s policy approach designed to persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or 
to neutralize their effect will not work unless there is a whole-sale change of policy by the Bush 
administration and U.S. Congress.  This is very unlikely, considering President G. W. Bush’s 
statements on Taiwan.  On April 26th, 2001, President Bush clearly delineated the United States 
                                                                                                                                                             




position on the defense of Taiwan by stating that the United States would “do whatever it takes” 
to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, even to the point of using U.S. troops.  The President 
recanted this statement in a later interview with CNN, stating that those comments should not be 
seen as an endorsement of independence for Taiwan. "Our nation will help Taiwan defend itself,’ 
he said.  At the same time, we support the one-China policy, and we expect the dispute to be 
resolved peacefully."180  President Bush’s most recent statement vis-à-vis Taiwan explicitly 
indicated that his administration plans on continuing the arms sales Taiwan in large quantities 
and that Beijing’s foreign policy approach of persuading the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan 
to neutralize their effective has a very low probability of succeeding. 
In accordance with Beijing’s foreign policy approach, senior PRC leadership comments 
have consistently mirrored this approach.  On February 29, 2000, Chi Haotian, vice chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (CMC) and minister of defense, met with Admiral Dennis 
Blair, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.  This was the first official meeting with a high level 
U.S. military delegation since the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in the Federation of 
Yugoslavia in May 1999.  According to the PRC news agency Xinhua: 
Chi Haotian urged the United States to handle the Taiwan issue appropriately by 
strictly adhering to the principles and relevant commitments established in the 
three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, stop selling arms to Taiwan, and do things 
that truly promote the great cause of China’s reunification. 181 
 
Also, comments by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in an 
interview with the New York Times on August 8, 2001, enunciated Beijing’s policy approach to 
U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.  First, Jiang described Taiwan as the most important issue in PRC-
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American relationships.  He also reflected on the issue of Washington establishing closer 
relationships with Taiwan by selling more advanced military hardware to it.  Then he added: 
We are opposed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  After the signing of the Aug. 17 
Joint Communiqué’s [of 1982], the U.S. side has pledged to reduce its arms sales 
to Taiwan, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.  But in fact what has 
happened has been the contrary… 182 
 
These statements stressed that U.S. arm sales to Taiwan are at the base of the conflict between 
the PRC and United States.  In addition, Jiang stipulated that the United States must stop selling 
arms to Taiwan in order to truly promote peace and the “one China” principle, which the United 
States acknowledged in the three joint communiqués. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Since 1982, the People’s Republic of China’s diplomatic efforts have either tried to 
persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or to neutralize their effectiveness and has 
categorized Beijing’s approach toward U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  These efforts have included 
increasing pressure on Taiwan, criticizing U.S. policy, engaging in indigenous military research 
and development, and acquiring arms from abroad.  From the PRC perspective, U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan is the counter-balance to its unwavering sacred goal of reunification.  On one hand, 
the PRC remains committed to peaceful unification, but on the other hand, it is unwilling to rule 
out the use of force. 
[U.S.] arms sales to Taiwan may be more than what the Chinese like to see and 
may certainly be less than what the Taiwanese hope for.  Though this looks like a 
clever choice, the United States will be unable to control how the Taiwan 
authorities will interpret this or how the situation in the Taiwan Strait will evolve 
on such a basis.183 
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183 Xiao Yu. “Pro-Taiwan Forces in United States Again Cook Up Excuses For Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Beijing 
Guangming Ribao , 2 February 2001. FBIS – translated text.  Document ID: CPP20010207000061. [PRC Paper on 






























V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
 This thesis has analyzed the effects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan after 1979 as a politically 
stabilizing factor in the Taiwan-China cross-strait relationship. It focused on the degree to which 
arms transfers deter China’s resort to military force and further the U.S. goal as defined in 
section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) regarding peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue.  Now U.S. arms sales will be set within the broader framework of the current cross-strait 
relations and examine implications for U.S. policy. 
It is my firm belief that American policy-makers have consistently viewed the Chinese 
government as being inadequate to or incapable of plausibly representing the will of its people, 
primarily because of the pervasive corruption of official China.  As a consequence of this 
phenomenon, its legitimacy diminished in the eyes of American policy makers.  Beginning in the 
1840s the Western world (primarily Britain) used superior military technology to exacerbate 
China’s inability to govern its sovereign territories for politically charged strategic security 
concerns in lieu of gaining economic advantages, and now this tradition is continued by the 
United States.184  From the Ch’ing dynasty to the communist regime that presently rules China, 
this has been the consensus in U.S. foreign policy decisions.  This relationship has endured and 
is what presently forms the base of the United States’ current arms sales policy to Taiwan. 
Prior to 1949 most Americans did not know, understand or care about the revolutionary 
forces working within China, but after the communist regime emerged victoriously, most 
Americans realized that its emergence symbolized a disaster for U.S. policies in Asia.185  Shortly 
after the communist victory in 1949, the American public began to rely on foreign press for the 
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majority of its information on the PRC.  However, U.S. policy-makers did not have to rely on the 
foreign press for its information on the PRC because their resources were much more robust and 
empirically based. 
Policy-makers and academic[ians] did not rely on the foreign press to inform 
them about China, although it played a role. What the intelligence community 
(IC) used to inform policy-makers were translations of Chinese press and 
magazines [plus official statements by senior leadership, government planning 
documents, and government affiliated documents] together with the usual 
‘national technical means.’186 
 
Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that the United States’ rapprochement with China was 
not based on America’s top decision-makers cynic political ambitions, but it was based on the 
pragmatic strategic indicators provided by the intelligence community.  As Kunsnitz observed, 
in an international environment perceived to be anarchic, survival of the state was 
seen as the prime goal of a nation’s foreign policy.  Individual interests and 
opinions had to be subordinate to the state’s survival, since this was—by 
definition—a precondition for societal progress.187 
 
Consequently the U.S. government temporarily sacrificed its political interest in Taiwan by 
signing the Shanghai communiqué in order to challenge the Soviet Union’s campaign for world 
hegemony.  Thus, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan dwindled and were at their lowest levels during the 
late 1970s. 
For the United States, the domestic functions that arms sales to Taiwan provided were 
more important than their overt political implications after the implementation of the of the 1979 
TRA and the signing of the 1982 joint communiqué by the Reagan administration.  This 
relationship endured until 1992, when the United States broke the long-standing deadlock and 
upgraded Taiwan’s weapon systems when President George H. Bush sold Taiwan 150 F-16 
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fighters, “thereby modifying the U.S. position as expressed in the August 1982 communiqué 
with the PRC.”188  Although, this decision was made in the wake of the Tiananmen incident and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and 
beneficiaries of the United States’ domestic industry and for political gains.  Thus, U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan since 1979 have been primarily brokered in reaction to domestic political 
apprehensions instead of the same type of pragmatic strategic indicators that were used by the 
United States in its rapprochement with China. 
Therefore, the decision by America’s top policy-makers to join the Chinese civil war in 
1950 was fundamentally a political decision, as is the decision for the present administration to 
continue participating in it.  The political ramifications of these decisions will not end after the 
fighting has stopped, but they will continue to influence the political calculus of all the states 
involved until either Taiwan capitulates, the war becomes too expensive for the PRC to continue 
fighting, or a peace settlement is reached.  The United States’ realpolitik approach toward the 
Chinese civil war is a clear example of this because it has indefinitely extended the hostilities of 
the Chinese civil war primarily through its foreign policy decisions in support of Taiwan. 
War duration is a key factor influencing the cost of war.  In a more political vein, 
wars and their duration have important effects on leaders’ popularity and the 
stability of national regimes.  Anticipating the outcome, duration, and cost of 
possible wars, leaders choose what wars to fight, leading to possible selection bias 
in the analysis of international conflict.189 
 
Currently, the PRC’s analysis of the Taiwan issue is skewed because of the ulterior political 
implications and tangible effects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979.  They have 
indefinitely lengthened the Chinese civil war by moving it to another level, meaning that it is no 
longer a direct civil war.  As a result, the PRC has not abandoned its sacred goal of reunifying 
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Taiwan with the mainland.  But, in the interim it has linked its goal of reunification closer to the 
tangible results of its ongoing military modernization effort in preparation for a contingency with 
Taiwan that will most likely involve the United States instead of diplomacy. 
The ulterior political implications of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan after 1979 continue to 
affect the PRC’s political calculus in such a way that it has indefinitely deferred its sacred goal 
of reunifying Taiwan until this issue is resolved.  Fundamentally, the PRC has chosen not to use 
military force because the cost of failure is presently too high in terms of military, economic, and 
political factors.  It is reported that Admiral Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific 
Command, 
…expressed that in the event that the PRC decided to attack Taiwan, neither the 
island's own military forces nor those of the U.S. would be able to prevent a great 
deal of damage being caused…Blair stated that such damage could come from 
missiles, long-range aviation and sabotage. The reality, however, is ‘that China 
cannot attain its stated goal of reunifying Taiwan by military force,’ he said. 
‘They do not have the military capability to take and hold Taiwan.’ This situation, 
in Blair's view, will remain unchanged as long as the U.S. adheres to the Taiwan 
Relations Act. Blair maintained that the situation across the Taiwan Strait, from a 
military point of view, is relatively stable, largely based on the continued U.S. 
pledge to support Taiwan militarily. Blair also commented, ‘In the meantime, I 
think we can hold the military ring to make that very unattractive for China to 
conduct military aggression, and we can have a good outcome for that part of the 
world.’190 
 
Currently the PRC exhibits no overt signs of trying to end the Taiwan question by military means 
because the use of force against Taiwan would have uncertain consequences for the PRC in 
terms its “national development strategy.”191 
 However, the increased military apprehension between Taipei and the Beijing has left the 
PRC with a huge dilemma because, 
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…no nation nowadays can elude the laws of economics in all spheres of social 
life, decisions regarding the merger or separation of states are also a matter of 
calculating the gains and losses in an economic equation.  China now is facing 
two alternatives in resolving Taiwan’s sovereignty issue: an imperialistic 
approach or a modern political approach. 192 
 
In lieu of the alternatives that the PRC faces, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 have been the 
primary factor affecting the PRC’s political calculus.  From this view, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
must be maintained at a high level in order to encourage the PRC’s pursuit of a modern political 
solution instead of an imperialistic one that might include the uses of force for the following 
reasons: 
1. “First and foremost is its need to defend itself against any threat to its survival…In other 
words Taiwan should not be deprived of the possibility of possessing a capable and 
modern military to sustain its claim to autonomy.”193 
 
2. “If Taiwan should engage in negotiations with the PRC, the possession of credible 
military capability would protect it from unwanted and unreasonable demands.”194 
 
3. “While economic strength is increasingly important in the modern world, it still cannot 
substitute for military power in serving as the final resort of diplomacy or as the staunch 
guard of territorial integrity.”195 
 
4. The level of military technology that the United States sells Taiwan sends a clear 
undiluted message to the PRC on its level of support and commitment for Taiwan. 
 
5. “The acquisition of new weapons can be a significant source of ‘reverse engineering’ or 
‘copy cat’ indigenous development for domestic reproduction and accommodation.”196 
 
6. “Taiwan’s democratization has…enhanced its ability to resist the infiltration of Chinese 
Communism ideology.”197 
 
7. With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and China’s rise as a regional 
threat to U.S. interest, Taiwan’s strategic location has resumed its importance. 
 
8. The PRC has not rescinded its right to use force against Taiwan. 
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Accordingly, the Bush administration’s hard line stance has defined a new level of support for 
Taiwan and has also increased the tensions in U.S.-PRC relations.198  Currently the most urgent 
need that the Bush administration has to address is the PRC’s dynamism because it has and will 
continue to create the most complex and perplexing problems that the United States will face in 
Asia.199  The Bush administration must leverage the present momentum for Taiwan and 
incorporate it into a well-defined long-term policy designed to advert a military clash between 
Taiwan and the PRC.  This can be done by using U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to either induce 
cooperation in the cross-strait negotiation process or by using them to sabotage the momentum of 
the PRC’s military modernization by supplying Taiwan with advanced technology until the 
Theater Missile Defense Systems (TMD) is developed and deployed. 
As the PRC’s military modernization continues to gain strength Taiwan’s ability to 
preserve its democratic ways, its self-defense capability and a limit amount of parity in the cross-
strait military balance of power has become increasingly more dependent on the level of U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan.  This will serve as a litmus test for the Bush administration as well as 
future administrations in terms of how well they will be able to look at the past, but grasp the 
present and future challenges that the PRC poses.  As more technologically advanced weaponry 
is sold to Taiwan by the present Bush administration, the PRC will continue to procure more 
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advance weaponry from Russia to maintain this relationship, consequently leaving its operational 
military effectiveness in question. 200   
                                                 
200 The mere acquisition of frontline military equipment and technology does not equate to instance military 
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constitute a shift in the balance of power.  Rather, a shift in the balance of power concomitant with the receipt of 
nonindigenous weapon demands that they be used efficiently, which makes this a question of military 
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